Streetwise Professor Craig Pirrong on Clearing Rule Conflict between United States and EU

University of Houston finance professor Craig Pirrong posted on his blog commentary discussing the ongoing conflict between the United States and EU regarding derivatives regulatory policy, and the consequences of the United States and EU not accepting each others clearing rules as equivalent.

According to Mr. Pirrong, this issue is particularly pressing due to the upcoming December 2014 deadline for the EU to recognize U.S. central counterparty clearing houses (“CCPs”) as equivalent. Mr. Pirrong stated that if this does not happen, European banks that use a U.S. CCP will face a substantially increased capital charge on the cleared positions.

Mr. Pirrong further explained that this “game of chicken going on between the EU and U.S.” could lead to the world derivatives market becoming more fragmented, and therefore less competitive – an outcome that is “cruelly ironic,” according to Mr. Pirrong, given that previous CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler claimed his regulatory agenda would make the markets more competitive. Mr. Pirrong went on to note that EU Commissioner Michel Barnier’s recent statement approving the CCPs of five countries outside the EU, but not the United States, can be read as “a giant one finger salute from the EU to the CFTC.”

Mr. Pirrong concluded that the United States and EU are “fighting over control,” and the outcome will be a more fragmented, less competitive, and less robust financial system.

Lofchie Comment: In his usual impolitic style, Professor Pirrong makes the point that the CFTC’s drive for more global regulatory power is meeting the countervailing force of non-U.S. regulators who see no reason to defer to the CFTC. The CFTC would seem not likely to persuade the European financial regulators to concede, since it is hard to imagine their motive to concede authority over European firms to the CFTC. Accordingly, the CFTC has put itself in the position where it must either retreat (the rational thing to do) or do further damage to the U.S. economy by essentially conceding that the world is going divide up into economic zones, with the end result both a smaller world economy and one in which the role of U.S. financial institutions is confined to the U.S. zone.

More generally, certain of the U.S. regulators seemed to be of the view that they can increase the scope and demands of U.S. regulation without any reaction from either other regulators or market participants. That is demonstrably not the case. If U.S. regulators assert global regulatory jurisdiction, non-U.S. regulators are going to push back.

See:What Gary Gensler, the Igor of Frankendodd, Hath Wrought,” Streetwise Professor.
Related news: EU Commissioner Barnier to Accept Clearing Rules from Five Countries outside EU, but Not the United States (July 1, 2014).

OFR Issues Working Paper on Shadow Banking

The Office of Financial Reserach (“OFR”) issued a working paper titled, “Shadow Banking: The Money View,” which presents an accounting framework for measuring the sources and uses of short-term funding in the global financial ecosystem.

The paper is accompanied by a map that tracks short-term funding flows from their ultimate sources to their ultimate uses, and across the hierarchy of short-term instruments issued by the sovereign, banks, and shadow banks globally.

See: OFR Working Paper: Shadow Banking: The Money View.

FATF Issues Report on Virtual Currencies and Potential AML Risks

On June 27, 2014, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) issued a report providing a general framework for understanding and addressing the anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism (“AML/CFT”) risks associated with virtual currencies such as Bitcoin. Building on its 2013 New Payment Products and Services (“NPPS”) Guidance, the FATF report proposes a common set of definitions that can be adopted by government officials, law enforcement and private sector entities to reflect accurately the different forms that virtual currencies may take. The report also lays out the potential AML/CFT vulnerabilities posed by virtual currencies, and profiles three recent law enforcement actions involving the abuse of virtual currency for money-laundering purposes: Liberty Reserve, Silk Road and Western Express International.

Lofchie YouTube Selection

 

SEC Issues Staff Bulletin on Proxy Voting

The SEC Divisions of Investment Management and Corporation Finance issued a staff bulletin regarding investment advisers’ responsibilities in voting client proxies, retaining proxy advisory firms, and the requirements of exemptions to the federal proxy rules that are often relied upon by proxy advisory firms.

The bulletin consists of a series of questions and answers pertaining to proxy voting, including the following:

  • Is an investment adviser required to vote every proxy?
  • What are some of the considerations that an investment adviser may wish to take into account if it retains a proxy advisory firm to assist in its proxy voting duties?
  • Does an investment adviser have an ongoing duty to oversee a proxy advisory firm that it retains?
  • What are an investment adviser’s duties when it retains a proxy advisory firm with respect to the material accuracy of the facts upon which the proxy advisory firm’s voting recommendations are based? 
  • When is a proxy advisory firm subject to federal proxy rules?

Lofchie Comment: Arguably, the most important point in this bulletin is that investment advisers are not required to vote every proxy. In particular, the bulletin concludes that “an investment adviser and its client may agree that the time and costs associated with the mechanics of voting proxies with respect to certain types of proposals or issuers may not be in the client’s best interest.” If investment advisers do not feel pressured to vote on matters that are of no interest to them or their clients, then they will not feel obligated to waste money paying proxy advisers to tell them how to vote on those matters. Consequently, the power of proxy advisers will be diminished.

See: Staff Legal Bulletin on Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory Firms.

 

Who Was at Bretton Woods?

In a new CFS paper, Mark Bernkopf and I offer a nearly complete list of the people who attended the 1944 Bretton Woods conference as delegates, secretarial staff, or journalists. There were roughly 700 people listed among several documents in the conference proceedings published in 1948 and the unpublished telephone directories issued during the conference.

In addition to the people directly concerned with the work of the conference, there were a number of Boy Scouts who helped distribute documents and move microphones, plus military messengers and police. None are listed in any document we have seen, though. Additionally, there were of course the staff not only of the Mount Washington Hotel, where the conference was held, but of three other hotels nearby that accommodated overflow boarders. The Bretton Arms Inn, within walking distance of the Mount Washington Hotel, is still in existence, while the more remote Crawford House and Maplewood Hotel no longer exist.

Mark Bernkopf, my coauthor, established in the 1990s what may have been the first Web site on central banking generally as opposed to the sites of particular central banks. It has since been superseded by other sites to which it served as an example and a spur, especially the “Central bank hub” section of the Bank for International Settlements site. After I found Mark’s site and contacted him by e-mail to ask him a question about it, we found that we lived within walking distance, and struck up a lasting friendship. A stint at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York before he established the Web site contributed to Mark’s interest in both the practice and history of central banking.

See Who Was at Bretton Woods?.

EU Commissioner Barnier to Accept Clearing Rules from Five Countries Outside EU, but Not the United States

EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Financial Services Michel Barnier said he intends to propose that the European Commission (“EC”) adopt “equivalence” decisions that will allow central counterparty clearing houses (“CCPs”) from five countries outside the European Union to clear EU derivatives trades. The allowed countries will be Japan, Singapore, Australia, Hong Kong and India.

Regarding the absence of the United States from the list, Commissioner Barnier noted that, if the CFTC gives effective equivalence to third-country CCPs, he is confident that the list will include the United States soon.

CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia wrote a letter to Commissioner Barnier on May 6, 2014, urging him to proceed with finding the U.S. regulatory regime equivalent under EMIR so that ESMA may recognize U.S. CCPs. Commissioner O’Malia stated that, although “there may be some nominal differences” between the regimes, the rules comply with the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures and are “essentially identical as a result of the collaboration, coordination, and cooperation between the CFTC and EC.”

Lofchie Comment: Here are the key points in the Barnier statement:

“I intend to propose shortly that the European Commission adopt ‘equivalence’ decisions that will allow CCPs from five countries outside the EU – Japan, Singapore, Australia, Hong Kong and India to clear EU derivatives trades.  This will be done in full deference to the rules and supervisory systems of those countries. . . . If the CFTC also gives effective equivalence to third country CCPs, deferring to strong and rigorous rules in jurisdictions such as the EU, we will be able to adopt equivalence decisions [recognizing U.S. clearing corporations] very soon.”

To put it more bluntly, the European Union has no intention of allowing the U.S. regulators to dictate how European regulators should regulate European financial institutions or financial conduct in Europe. 

Credit should be given to Commissioner O’Malia for reaching out to Commissioner Barnier and trying to avoid this result, but there is a history of contentiousness between the CFTC under former Chairman Gensler and the European Union. That history apparently resulted in the EU taking a “show me” approach, which could not be overcome by Commissioner O’Malia’s letter, as he does not speak as chairman of the agency. Commissioner Barnier’s response should be taken as a caution to those U.S. regulators who believe that they can dictate global regulation. Other regulators can and will push back. The potential danger of this dispute not being resolved is nothing short of a trade war. 

See: Commissioner Barnier’s Statement
See also: Commissioner O’Malia’s Letter.