SEC Commissioner Gallagher Remarks on Corporate Disclosure

At the 2nd Annual Institute for Corporate Counsel, SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher delivered a speech in which he discussed corporate disclosure reform.  Commissioner Gallagher stated that, without an effective disclosure policy, the SEC cannot foster capital formation in fair and efficient markets. He also stated that, from an investor’s perspective, “excessive illumination by too much disclosure can have the same effect as obfuscation – it becomes difficult or impossible to discern what really matters.”

According to Commissioner Gallagher, the SEC must engage in a self-examination of its disclosure requirements, beginning with addressing the more “discrete” issues rather than incurring the “risk spending years preparing an offensive so massive that it may never be launched.” He stated that congressional mandates dominate the SEC agenda, and that many of those mandates, such as Dodd-Frank, do not appear to view corporate disclosure reform as a priority. According to Gallagher, the SEC must set a more rational agenda that includes improving SEC regulatory programs which predate Dodd-Frank.

Commissioner Gallagher went on to list a number of issues which he believes should be the primary points of focus, including:

  • “layering disclosure,” or distinguishing between information that is inherently material and should be the focus of a disclosure document, such as a company’s financial statement, and information that is not inherently material and should be reported elsewhere, such as the pay-ratio calculation required pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 953(b);
  • streamlining Form 8-K disclosure, and considering whether investors really need all of the information updated immediately in order to know what is material about a company’s current condition;
  • an effort to reduce redundancy in filings;
  • streamlining proxy statements to make their contents as clear and concise as possible, and implementing a more standardized, online disclosure system;
  • streamlining registration statements by permitting forward incorporation by reference in Form S-1 registration statements;
  • increasing the reliability of SEC guidance by enhancing its authority and issuing significant guidance with SEC endorsement rather than by the staff alone;
  • renewing the focus on the potential of technology to improve corporate disclosure; and
  • treating “special, meaning politically-motivated, disclosures as the anomalies they are.” According to Gallagher, there is no reason to expect that Congress will give up issuing specific disclosure requirements, and stated that he expects Congress to continue to further policy objectives unrelated to providing investors with information that is material to their investment decisions.

Commissioner Gallagher also mentioned that the SEC should resist successive rounds of concept releases and roundtables, and instead seek more practical solutions to specific problems.

Lofchie Comment: This speech is interesting for its specific content as to securities disclosure, but even more so for its discussion of the interaction between the Congress and the regulators. In short, Commissioner Gallagher asks: What should a responsible regulator do when Congress directs the regulator to adopt rules that are, at best, irrelevant to the overall work of the regulatory agency and, at worst, affirmatively destructive to the economic system? The answer that Commissioner Gallagher gives is that the regulator should prioritize; where there are limited resources, the responsible regulator should focus first on those ongoing regulatory requirements that are central to the mission of the agency, and only then turn to other requirements that are either irrelevant or affirmatively destructive. As a specific example of this, Commissioner Gallagher says he would prioritize the SEC’s ongoing mission of improving corporate disclosure for the benefit of investors and set a lower priority on Congressional mandates that are not intended to provide any investor benefit, such as the Congressional mandate on disclosures in regard to conflict minerals.

For anyone who cares about the quality of U.S. financial regulation, it is difficult to disagree with Commissioner Gallagher’s views as to the function of the regulators. Congressional overreach as a response to crisis, however, jeopardizes a functioning economy. Regulators, as the adults in the room, are the only ones positioned to blunt the damage. Imagine if regulators had adopted Dodd-Frank in full and done it on the time scale mandated by Congress. The financial system would have come to a complete stop. Query, would that have been better than an ongoing deterioration of a “policy” that provides the framework for our financial regulatory system.

See: Commissioner Gallagher’s Speech.
Related news: SEC Chair White Delivers Speech on Disclosure Requirements (October 16, 2013).

 

FRB Issues Final Rule Changes in Order to Align with the Basel III Capital Framework

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”) issued a final rule to align certain of its capital rules with the Basel III capital framework, which was adopted by the FRB earlier this year.  The changes to the rule reflect modifications by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development regarding country risk classifications. The final rule also clarifies criteria for determining whether underlying assets are delinquent for certain traded securitization positions. Additionally, it clarifies disclosure deadlines, and modifies the definition of a covered position.

FRB also made minor modifications to the Basel III revised capital framework to clarify the criteria for subordinated debt instruments that may be counted as Tier 2 capital. 

See: Regulatory Capital Final Rule Change; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines Final Rule Change; FRB Press Release.

 

FRB Releases Guidance on Managing Outsourcing Risk

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”) has issued the Guidance on Managing Outsourcing Risk to remind financial institutions supervised by the FRB to exercise appropriate risk management and oversight when using service providers.

According to the guidance, a “service provider” is defined as any organization or entity, such as a consultant, that enters into a contractual relationship with a financial institution to provide business functions or activities, such as accounting, auditing, loan review, compliance, or risk management. The guidance describes factors that financial institutions should consider when choosing a service provider, risks from the use of service providers, and how service providers should be overseen. Additionally, the guidance reminds financial institutions that the use of service providers does not relieve a financial institution’s board of directors or senior managers of responsibility for the activities performed by service providers.

Lofchie Comment: The report provides a very solid overview of concerns pertaining to establishing outsourcing arrangements, including a checklist of areas that a firm should consider adding to an outsourcing contract. Although the report is directed at banks, broker-dealers and other regulated institutions will also find the report useful.

See: FRB Guidance on Managing Outsourcing Risk; FRB Supervision and Regulation Letter on the Guidance; FRB Press Release.

 

SEC Commissioners Deliver Remarks at Proxy Services Roundtable

SEC Commissioners Michael Piwowar and Luis Aguilar discussed their concerns regarding proxy advisory firms at the SEC’s proxy roundtable.

Commissioner Piwowar delivered the opening remarks at the Roundtable, expressing his concern that the 2003 SEC Proxy Voting release, which stated that “the duty of care requires an adviser with voting authority to monitor corporate actions and vote proxies,” may have created a regulatory compliance mandate to vote every share. Additionally, Piwowar said that the subsequent SEC staff no-action letters “had the unintended effect of institutionalizing the use of proxy advisory firms to vote shares in compliance with this perceived mandate.” He stated that these issues must be addressed immediately, further noting that they are inconsistent with the SEC’s investor protection mandate.

Commissioner Aguilar voiced his concern regarding proxy firms’ conflicts of interests. He referenced a 2010 concept release on proxy voters which stated that conflicts of interests are not sufficiently disclosed and managed. He explained that potential or actual conflicts of interest can be “cured by disclosure and efforts to insulate proxy advisory recommendations from a firm’s consulting business,” and echoed Commissioner’s Piwowar’s sentiment that the SEC’s primary focus should be on protecting investors.

See: Commissioner Piwowar’s Remarks; Commissioner Alguilar’s Remarks.

SIFMA and ISDA Submit Comments Regarding MarketAxess MAT Determination

SIFMA and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (“ISDA”) have submitted comments to the CFTC on the made-available-to-trade (“MAT”) submission by MarketAxess for certain credit default swaps pursuant to CEA Section 5(c) (“Common Provisions Applicable to Registered Entities”) and CFTC Rule 40.6(a) (“Self-Certification of Rules”).

According to the comment letter, SIFMA and ISDA support the contract-by-contract approach taken by MarketAxess with respect to the six factors set out in the submission. The agencies also support MarketAxess’s demonstration of how it supports the trading of the credit default swaps. Additionally, the agencies request that the CFTC address the cross-border packaged swap issues that “will become even more important as a result of a MAT determination.”

Lofchie Comment: In effect, the trade associations are saying that the CFTC’s “MAT Rules” should be revised to require a more detailed and specific submission request by a SEF and a more thorough review by the CFTC. See similar comments in yesterday’s news: Javelin SEF Submits More Limited MAT Determination to CFTC (with SIFMA AMG Comment Letter).

See: SIFMA Comment Letter; SIFMA Press Release.

 

Market Participants File Lawsuit Challenging CFTC Cross-Border Guidance for Being a Rule Adopted in Violation of the APA

ISDA, SIFMA, and the Institute of International Bankers (“IIB”) (the “Associations”) have filed a joint legal challenge to the CFTC Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations (“Cross-Border Rule”) and related cross-border rules.

The lawsuit alleges that the CFTC unlawfully circumvented the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act and the CEA by portraying its regulations as “guidance.”  By circumventing the rulemaking process, including failing to conduct a cost-benefit analysis required by law, that the CFTC has enacted rules which the Associations believe are duplicative, overlapping and contradictory.  According to the Associations, this “overreach could cause global fragmentation in markets,” which could reduce liquidity and significantly harm market participants and market-based financing.  Additionally, the lawsuit alleges that by not conducting any cost-benefit analysis as required by law, the cross-border rules create significant administrative, financial, and legal burdens that could negatively affect liquidity and the ability of end users to manage risk.

Furthermore, the Associations argue, there is global consensus among regulators regarding the regulatory reform initiatives in OTC derivatives.  The joint CFTC-EU statement, “Path Forward,” affirms that all rules must not overlap or duplicate one another in order to avoid conflicts of law.  The Associations cite an example in which a non-U.S. swap dealer that is transacting with a non-U.S. customer could be required to comply with the CFTC’s transaction-level requirements if the dealer’s U.S. office assists in the transaction.  This would mean that the same trade would be required to be cleared at both a U.S. and non-U.S. clearinghouse.  The Associations believe that the CFTC’s cross-border guidance and subsequent interpretations undermine the global commitment to prevent contradictory, overlapping and duplicative requirements, which has led non-U.S. counterparties to avoid transacting with U.S. dealers and non-U.S. dealers based in the U.S.

Lofchie Comment:  From the day on which the CFTC Cross-Border Guidance was issued, I have said that I believed that (i) the CFTC’s Cross-Border Guidance was issued in violation of law and (ii) the CFTC was not likely in the long run to achieve anything from such violation.  See, e.g.,  CFTC Approves Cross-Border Guidance and Exemptive Order (July 15, 2013).  That belief will now play itself out as predicted.

One of two things may happen now.  First, the CFTC may lose this case, which I believe it should.  Second, the CFTC may win this case (if some judge grants the CFTC an extraordinary measure of regulatory deference) on the ground that the CFTC’s “guidance” is, as the CFTC sometimes asserts, just guidance – not enforceable as a rule – in which case the CFTC is left with “guidance” that (beyond being ill-advised as a matter of substance) has little legal effect because the supposed “guidance” (not being a legally-adopted rule) cannot serve as the basis for an enforcement action.

Further, the CFTC’s difficulties go beyond this legal challenge to the cross-border guidance.  If the position limits rule is adopted in its present form, there is the very likely possibility of a further challenge to that rule given, what seems to be a very strong argument, that the rule is not properly supported by either academic foundation or cost-benefit analysis.  While the CFTC has touted itself as being ahead of other regulatory agencies in adopting rules to implement Dodd-Frank, that lead has been achieved by adopting rules in disregard of the comments of market participants (both buy and sell-side) and of other regulators, sometimes on the basis of cost-benefit analyses that seem implausible on their face.  The result has been the adoption of rules that are, at best, enormously expensive to implement, and sometimes wholly impossible to implement.  That would be bad enough, but, worse still, as we have often commented, we believe that many of the rules will both increase systemic risk and damage the economy.

When the new Chairman of the CFTC is appointed, that person is likely to find that the CFTC’s lead in rule adoption is illusory – a Potemkin village build without any foundation on either economic policy or legal process.

See:  Complaint; Joint Press Release; Background Leading up to Complaint.

Javelin SEF Submits More Limited MAT Determination to CFTC (with SIFMA AMG Comment Letter)

Javelin SEF announced that it has amended and limited its “made available to trade” (“MAT”) submission with respect to interest rate swaps to the CFTC. A swap that is made available to trade must be traded on a CFTC-regulated futures exchange or swap execution facility.

Javelin’s original submission, which was criticized for being too broad, initially covered all interest rate swap tenors from one month to 51 years in U.S. dollar, sterling and euro currencies. The updated MAT determination only includes benchmark dollar and euro swaps, along with certain international monetary market (“IMM”) swaps.

According to James Cawley, CEO of Javelin Capital Markets: “What has become clear is that considerable operational hurdles remain as the market prepares for the swap trading mandate. Starting with benchmark swaps is the only thing that makes sense right now.”

The Asset Management Group of SIFMA (“SIFMA AMG”) had submitted comments regarding Javelin’s filing of a narrowed MAT determination, stating that the original Javelin submission was “overbroad” and “should have been rejected by the Commission for failing to make a sufficient showing for the swaps covered thereunder.” SIFMA AMG said that it was therefore “pleased that Javelin has acknowledged the concerns that we and other participants had,” and stated that the association planned to comment on the amended submission when the CFTC opens the comment period.

Lofchie Comment: While it is obviously a positive for the financial markets that Javelin has limited its “MAT” determination, the submission process and the subsequent withdrawal illustrate how remarkably ill-conceived the CFTC’s rulemaking with respect to “MAT” was. In its amended filing, Javelin concedes that “there remain significant operational and logistical issues, with regard to participant readiness to functionally trade various swap products on SEFs in the near term.” Remarkably enough, under the CFTC’s own rules, the fact that the market is not ready to be forced to trade exclusively on SEFs would not have given the CFTC reason to reject Javelin’s submission. In fact, the CFTC was so relaxed about forcing the entire interest rate market in the United States to trade through SEFs that, by the CFTC’s own estimate, preparation of the regulatory submission requiring the transformation of the entire swaps market would cost about $850.

The task of reviewing MAT determinations may ultimately fall to a new Chairman at the CFTC. That Chairman ought to consider whether the CFTC’s review going forward should be limited by the CFTC’s existing review procedures which set a remarkably low standard for mandating a complete transformation of the financial markets by regulatory fiat. Rather than reviewing MAT submissions under the current rules, the new Chairman should revisit the MAT rules. Even regulators who are believers in the benefits of exchange trading will not help their cause if they force trading of swaps onto markets that are not ready to do business.

See: Amended Javelin MAT Submission.
See also: SIFMA AMG Comment Letter; SIFMA Press Release.

 

CFTC Issues Proposed Position Limits Rule for Derivatives (Pre-Fed. Reg.)

The CFTC has published new proposed regulations regarding speculative position limits. The proposed rules are intended to establish position limits for 28 exempt and agricultural commodity futures and option contracts, and physical commodity swaps that are “economically equivalent” to such contracts. The CFTC also proposed to update some relevant definitions, revise exemptions for speculative position limits and update reporting requirements. In addition, the CFTC proposed to update certain rules, guidance and acceptable practices for compliance with Designated Contract Market (“DCM”) core principle 5 and Swap Execution Facility (“SEF”) core principle 6 with respect to exchange-set speculative position limits and position accountability levels.

See: Text of Proposed Rule Change.

CFTC Publishes Final Rules for Derivatives Clearing Organizations to Align with International Standards (Fed. Reg. Version)

The CFTC published in the Federal Register the finalized version of rules which establish international standards for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations (SIDCOs). According to the CFTC, the new rules, in conjunction with existing derivative clearing rules, establish regulations that are consistent with the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs). This will allow U.S. SIDCOs to continue to be Qualifying Central Counterparties for purposes of international bank capital standards. The new rules include provisions concerning procedural requirements for opting in to the regulatory regime, as well as substantive requirements relating to governance, financial resources, system safeguards, special default rules and procedures for uncovered losses or short falls, risk management, additional disclosure requirements, efficiency and recovery and wind-down procedures.

Lofchie Comment:  The aspect of these rules that has received the most negative market commentary and negative academic attention (and deservedly so) is the provision that a clearing corporation may not treat U.S. Treasury Securities as inherently good collateral.  Rather, U.S. Treasuries may be treated as good collateral only “convertible into cash pursuant to prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements.”  Apparently, the CFTC believes that not only cockroaches, rats and North Dakotans with very deep shelters will survive a nuclear holocaust and the downfall of the U.S. government: so will CFTC-regulated clearing corporations.  Unfortunately, most market participants are not likely to do as well, so preserving the clearing corporations is not much of a benefit.  See also YouTube selection

Other than the general absurdity of believing that clearing corporations may continue to function notwithstanding the failure of the U.S. government, this rule highlights one of the major systemic risks that clearing corporations create for the rest of the financial system.  Because banks and other clearing members have no ability to negotiate any limits on the amount of collateral that can be required of them from a clearing agency, including at a time of market volatility and a liquidity crunch, the legally unrestrained demand for clearing corporations for more cash margin (not even Treasuries are good enough) in order to protect themselves has the potential to drain collateral and liquidity from the banking system and from the economy generally.  In short, the clearing corporations may have the power to save themselves by throwing the banking system overboard.

For a more economically learned expression of the concern expressed above,  see All Pain, No Gain: the CFTC’s Rule on Qualifying Liquid ResourcesSome of Cassandra’s (AKA SWP’s) Warnings on Clearing Begin to Take Hold;   Speech by Federal Reserve Governor Powell: OTC Infrastructure Reform: Opportunities and Challenges.  Also consider these questions: when Congress mandated central clearing under Dodd-Frank, did it in fact have time to consider whether mandated central clearing would in fact reduce system risk?  What was the body of evidence that it considered?  What were the scenarios that it considered?  What if Congress made a mistake?

See: 78 FR 72476.
Related News: CFTC Issues Final Rules for Derivatives Clearing Organizations to Align with International Standards (Pre-Fed. Reg.) (November 18, 2013).

 

OCC Publishes Liquidity Coverage Ratio Proposed Banking Regulations (Fed. Reg. Version)

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) have published new rules in the Federal Register to strengthen the liquidity positions of large financial institutions. The proposal would for the first time create a standardized minimum liquidity requirement for large, internationally active and systemically important banking organizations (i.e., banking organizations with more than $250 billion in total assets or more than $10 billion in on-balance sheet foreign exposure, and to their consolidated subsidiaries that are depository institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets), as well as nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.

See: 78 FR 71818.
Related news: Liquidity Coverage Ratio Proposed Banking Regulations (Pre-Fed. Reg. Version) (October 25, 2013).