Senate Ag Committee Holds Hearing on HFT and Automated Trading in Futures Markets

The Senate Agriculture Committee held a hearing that focused on the effects of high-frequency trading (“HFT”) in the futures markets and allowed committee members to ask witnesses questions concerning HFT, latency and risk controls. 

Witnesses at the hearing included:

See: Senate Agriculture Committee Hearing Information and Video; Chair Stabenow’s Remarks

 

House Financial Services Subcommittee Chairmen Send Letter to FSB and FSOC Requesting Information on Methodologies Used to Designate G-SIFIs

Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), Representative Scott Garrett (R-NJ), and other House Financial Services Subcommittee Chairmen (the “Representatives”) requested that the Financial Stability Board and the Financial Stability Oversight Council provide all memoranda or communiques between the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors concerning the methodologies used to designate global systemically important financial institutions (“G-SIFIs”). 

The letter is addressed to Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Chair Janet Yellen, and SEC Chair Mary Jo White, in their capacities as members of the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) and the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).  In the letter, the Representatives state that they have concerns that decisions are being made that “could have significant impact on the U.S. economy and its citizens through a nontransparent process, by an international body [the FSB] that is not accountable to the American people.”

Although the Representatives state that the letter was written specifically to request information from the FSB and the FSOC, it also details broader concerns regarding the FSOC and the FSB including, according to the letter, (i) the lack of transparency and due process in the designation of firms as SIFIs or G-SIFIs, (ii) the types of firms that are being considered for designation and why, and (iii) the consequences of designation on individual companies, industries and the economy as a whole.  

The letter goes on to recommend that the FSOC and the FSB address these concerns by:

  • explaining how the FSOC’s designation process relates to the FSB’s, and provide assurances that decisions on the systemic importance of U.S. firms are not being outsourced to the G-20;
  • providing specific metrics to support designation of nonbank financial companies that provide a clear definition of “systemic risk,” and explain the basis for determining which firms pose such risks;
  • clarifying the FSOC’s capital standards applicable to designated insurers as well as the consequences of designation, and identify the gaps in the FSOC’s financial regulation before further designating any insurers;
  • offering to meet with firms being considered for SIFI or G-SIFI designation;
  • allowing members of multi-member boards of commissions, such as the SEC, to participate in the FSOC’s deliberations;
  • clarifying the “national authority” designation and explaining how the FSB has implemented this provision; and
  • generally providing greater FSB transparency on all of its activities. 

The Representatives stated that the FSOC and the FSB should submit the requested information and answer questions by May 16, 2014. 

Lofchie Comment: The underlying problem is Section 113 of Dodd-Frank (“Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies”). This provision grants the FSOC broad discretion to designate entities as SIFIs, based on terms (such as “interconnectedness”) that are so open-ended that there is no objective measure under the terms of the statute by which the designations of the FSOC can be assessed (See May 6th comment). One can defend the FSOC on the basis that its’ actions derive from the unfettered grant of power contained in the statute, for which Congress is to blame, and not the FSOC. While it is true that the underlying problem is statutory, it does not follow that because the FSOC is legally authorized to act in a completely secretive manner that it should do so. There is nothing in the statute that prevents the FSOC from acting more transparently. This would allow Congress and the public to more fairly assess any determinations made by the FSOC and, of at least equal importance, it would allow companies that might be subject to SIFI designation to modify their activities so as to avoid the designation.

See: House Financial Services Subcommittee Chairmen Letter.
See also: Financial Stability Board (home page).
Related news: House Financial Services Committee Chairman Hensarling Urges Secretary Lew to Cease Using “Too Big to Fail” Designations (May 9, 2014); Representative Garrett Questions the SIFI Designation Authority Granted to FSOC by Dodd-Frank (May 6, 2014); House Subcommittee Chair Garrett Delivers Opening Remarks at Oversight of SEC Hearing, Focuses on FSOC and NMS (April 30, 2014); House Financial Services Subcommittee Chairman Introduces Legislation to Reform FSOC (April 4, 2014); SEC Commissioner Aguilar Gives FSOC Thumbs-Down on Mutual Funds, Discusses Cybersecurity and Reg. NMS (April 3, 2014).

 

FRB Requests Comment on Proposed Rulemaking to Implement Section 622 of Dodd-Frank

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”) is requesting comment on a proposed rule that would implement Dodd-Frank Section 622 (“Concentration Limits on Large Financial Firms”).  Section 622 prohibits a financial company from combining with another company if the ratio of the resulting financial company’s liabilities exceeds a certain percentage of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies.

Specifically, Section 622 of Dodd-Frank added Section 14 to the Bank Holding Company Act to establish a financial sector concentration limit; this limit would prohibit a financial company from merging or consolidating with, or acquiring, another company if the resulting company’s liabilities upon consummation would exceed 10 percent of the aggregate liabilities of all financial companies as calculated under that section. 

Companies subject to the concentration limit would include insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, foreign banking organizations, companies that control insured depository institutions, and nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “FSOC”) for FRB supervision.

Section 622 requires that the FSOC complete a study regarding the impact of any such concentration limit on financial stability, which was published in January 2011, and required the FRB to adopt implementing regulations reflecting the FSOC’s study. The FRB’s proposed regulation would implement Section 622’s concentration limit, as modified by the FSOC’s recommendations. In particular, under the proposed regulation, the FRB would measure and disclose the aggregate liabilities of financial companies annually, and would calculate aggregate liabilities as a two-year average. The proposed regulation would also establish reporting requirements for certain financial companies that otherwise do not file regulatory financial reports.

Comments on the proposed regulation must be submitted by July 8, 2014.

See: Text of Proposed Rule.

 

FSOC Issues 2014 Annual Report

The Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) issued its 2014 Annual Report, which describes significant financial market and regulatory developments identified by FSOC, analyzes emerging potential threats and makes certain recommendations. 

The report discussed:

  • vulnerability to runs in wholesale funding markets, including tri-party repo and money market mutual funds, which can lead to destabilizing fire sales;
  • developments in financial products and new business practices and in the migration of certain financial activities outside of the regulatory perimeter;
  • the potential risk-taking incentives of large, complex and interconnected financial institutions;
  • reliance on reference rates that may be susceptible to manipulation, such as LIBOR and foreign exchange rate benchmarks;
  • the need for financial institutions and market participants to remain vigilant in relation to potential interest rate volatility;
  • cyberthreats and the increase of trading-related operational outages and incidents that could cause disruptions to markets and the financial system;
  • potential risks to U.S. financial stability and economic activity from financial developments abroad;
  • the importance of closing financial data gaps and improving financial data quality; and
  • the need for significant reform in the housing finance system, including increased private capital, a reduction in the footprint of government-sponsored enterprises and improvements in mortgage finance market infrastructure.

Lofchie Comment: One of the criticisms made of FSOC is that, unlike most of the financial regulatory agencies, its membership is drawn entirely from a single party rather than both.  FSOC’s annual report gives evidence as to why the criticism is justified, and why it is detrimental to an organization that is supposed to assess systemic risk to draw its members solely from one party, thereby not affording any opportunity for its conclusions to be challenged by the other.  That is, there is tremendous incentive for the organization to conclude that the policies of the governing party are wise and to downplay the risk that those policies may create.

In the case of this annual report, the primary example of this is the discussion of central clearing of derivatives.  While there are many who believe that mandatory central clearing decreases systemic risk, there are also some who disagree with the idea that forcing so much credit risk, not to mention operational risk, into only a few conduits increases systemic risk.  Even those who believe that central clearing results in a net diminution of systemic risk generally would concede that it also carries its own material systemic risks.  Yet there is almost nothing about this in FSOC’s annual report.

Similarly, the annual report raises concerns about the risks created by the fact that broker-dealers do not have access to the same sources of liquidity as banks, including deposits and the Fed Window.  This concern ought to highlight one of the most worrisome problems created by Dodd-Frank.  The business of dealing in derivatives is essentially a credit activity and, like most credit activities, is most logically conducted in banks.  That Dodd-Frank is going to push derivatives dealing out of banks and onto broker-dealers and other institutions that will not be able to access liquidity as easily as banks is a major systemic risk and one that should not be ignored.  Yet the annual report makes no mention of this, which shows that the value of the report is reduced by the fact that, ultimately, it is a partisan document.

See: FSOC 2014 Annual Report.

 

The Second Circuit Finds U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Reach “Foreign Squared” Transactions

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiffs cannot assert securities laws claims for foreign-issued shares purchased on a foreign exchange, even if the shares are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange or the “buy order” was placed within the U.S.

In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the anti-fraud provisions of Exchange Act Section 10(b) (“Manipulative and Deceptive Devices”) and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 (“Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices”) cannot reach purchases of foreign-issued securities by foreign investors on foreign exchanges – so-called “foreign cubed” transactions – and held that the antifraud provisions apply only to the “purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”[1]

In the wake of Morrison, securities plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court left open the question of whether or not Section 10(b) claims can be brought relating to “foreign squared” transactions where a purchaser located in the U.S. transacts in a foreign-issued security on a foreign exchange. On May 6, 2014, the Second Circuit decided as a matter of first impression that Morrison‘s constraints on the extraterritorial reach of the Exchange Act precluded such claims.

In City of Pontiac v. UBS AG,[2] in connection with their purchase of UBS shares, investors brought a putative class action against UBS that alleged violations of Exchange Act Sections 10(b) and 20(a) (“Liability of Controlling Persons and Persons Who Aid and Abet Violations”). These shares were not only listed on foreign exchanges, but also cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”). One of the plaintiffs was a U.S. investor who had purchased shares by placing a “buy order” in the United States that was later executed on a Swiss exchange. The Court of Appeals held that the fact that a purchaser is a U.S. entity “does not affect whether the transaction was foreign or domestic,” and affirmed the judgment of the district court that Morrison prohibits claims based on purchases of foreign shares on foreign exchanges.[3]

The Second Circuit closed another window, arguably left open after Morrison, by rejecting the plaintiffs’ so-called “listing theory,” holding that the mere fact that UBS’s shares were cross-listed on the NYSE did not categorically bring them within the ambit of Section 10(b).  The plaintiffs argued that, by its express terms, the first prong of the holding in Morrison permitted claims related to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges.”[4] The Court of Appeals rejected this reading as “irreconcilable with Morrison read as a whole,” and found that “Morrison does not support the application of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to claims by a foreign purchaser of foreign-issued shares on a foreign exchange simply because those shares are also listed on a domestic exchange.”[5]

See: City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. et al. v. UBS AG.


[1] Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. at 247, 273 (2010).

[2] City of Pontiac v. UBS AG, No. 12‐4355‐cv (2nd Cir. May 6, 2014) (Slip Op.)

[3] Id., Slip Op. at pp. 15-16.

[4] Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273.

[5] City of Pontiac, Slip Op. at 14.

 

SEC Commissioner Stein Discusses SEC Priorities to Improve Market Efficiency

At a conference sponsored by the Council of Institutional Investors, SEC Commissioner Kara Stein spoke about ways in which the SEC can make the markets more efficient by better informing and empowering investors. 

Commissioner Stein stated that federal securities laws are based on the premise that an informed investor is the key to robust and efficient markets, noting that evaluating disclosure requirements is one area where the SEC needs reexamine its current practices.  In doing so, she stated, the SEC should not focus on removing redundancies and outdated disclosures.  Instead, it should focus on creating better, timelier and more relevant disclosure practices for investors.

Commissioner Stein explained that investors need not only to be informed, but also to be “empowered.”  She said that the SEC must examine the “shareholder voting franchise” to ensure that “basic principles of corporate democracy are supported.”  She also stated that it might be time “to take a hard look at our process for evaluating issuer no-action requests to exclude shareholder proposals,” since both issuers and shareholders need more clarity and consistency as to which proposals are appropriate under SEC rules.  

Finally, Commissioner Stein discussed the ways in which modern markets operate, with particular emphasis on high-frequency and/or algorithmic trading.  She explained that while a vast majority of rules that govern modern markets focus on the interactions between individuals, this approach is becoming outdated.  This transition, she stated, should be a catalyst for regulators to review “comprehensively” how markets work.  Specifically, Commissioner Stein stated that the SEC’s efforts should focus on routing practices and how lit and dark markets interact. 

See: Commissioner Stein’s Speech.

 

House Financial Services Committee Chairman Hensarling Urges Secretary Lew to Cease Using ”Too Big to Fail” Designations

During a hearing on the state of the international financial system, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) called on U.S. Treasury Department Secretary and Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) Chair Jacob Lew to “cease and desist” from designating more financial firms as “too big to fail” until there is an opportunity for greater congressional oversight of the FSOC’s decision-making process. 

According to Chairman Hensarling, there “is increasingly bipartisan concern about the immense discretionary power that FSOC has and how frankly little transparency it has,” stating that there is little indication of a methodology behind FSOC’s ability to effectively put nonbank institutions into bailout positions. 

Chairman Hensarling pressed Secretary Lew further to explain FSOC’s decision making during a question-and-answer exchange at the hearing. 

See: Video of Question-and-Answer Exchange; House Financial Services Committee Press Release.
See also: Webcast of Full Hearing; Secretary Lew’s Testimony
Related news: Representative Garrett Questions the SIFI Designation Authority Granted to FSOC by Dodd-Frank (May 6, 2014); House Subcommittee Chair Garrett Delivers Opening Remarks at Oversight of SEC Hearing, Focuses on FSOC and NMS (April 30, 2014); House Financial Services Subcommittee Chairman Introduces Legislation to Reform FSOC (April 4, 2014); SEC Commissioner Aguilar Gives FSOC Thumbs-Down on Mutual Funds, Discusses Cybersecurity and Reg. NMS (April 3, 2014).

 

SIFMA Says Asset Managers Do Not Pose Systemic Risk

Timothy W. Cameron, Managing Director and Head of SIFMA’s Asset Management Group (“AMG”), published a blog post disputing the assertion by the Financial Services Oversight Council (better known as the FSOC) that asset managers may pose systemic risk and the larger asset management firms might be designated as subject to the additional regulatory burdens applicable to systemically significant firms.

Mr. Cameron identified key ways in which asset managers differ from other financial institutions.  First, he stated that asset managers invest money on behalf of their investor clients, serving as fiduciaries with a legal obligation to invest assets according to guidelines set by clients.  Therefore, Mr. Cameron reasoned that “asset managers function as risk mitigators, not risk takers, because they actively manage risk.”  He explained that the success or failure of an asset management firm does not impact investor assets. Simply put, he stated that “there is a legal separation between a firm’s assets and the assets of its customers.”

Furthermore, Mr. Cameron explained that AMG recently completed a survey of buy-side firms to help regulators gain insight into their risk profile.  According to AMG, the results of the survey found that separate accounts do not pose a specific or unique threat to financial stability.

Lofchie Comment: The FSOC’s argument that asset management firms may be designated as systemically significant is not convincing. Cameron’s tutorial on the role asset managers play and the differences between asset managers and other financial institutions serves to raise questions as to (i) the FSOC’s competence, at least outside of the banking arena, and (ii) whether the FSOC is primarily motivated by political rather than economic considerations.

See: SIFMA Blog Post. 
FSOC report: Asset Management and Financial Stability.
Related news: Representative Garrett Questions the SIFI Designation Authority Granted to FSOC by Dodd-Frank (May 6, 2014); SIFMA AMG Releases Survey on Separate Accounts’ Impact on Systemic Risk (April 14, 2014).

 

SEC Issues Investor Alert on Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments

The SEC Office of Investor Education and Advocacy issued an Investor Alert intended to make investors aware of the potential risks of investments involving Bitcoin and other forms of virtual currency. 

The Investor Alert describes Bitcoin and its properties, explaining that investments involving Bitcoin may lead to a heightened risk of fraud.  The Investor Alert also provides additional resources to further explore the topic, including links to past SEC and FINRA Investor Alerts on digital currency, IRS Virtual Currency Guidance, and recent lawsuits and cases involving virtual currency.

See: SEC Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments.
Related news: IRS Provides Guidance on the Taxation of Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency (March 27, 2014).