{"id":4829,"date":"2014-07-23T11:13:30","date_gmt":"2014-07-23T15:13:30","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/?p=4829"},"modified":"2014-07-25T11:17:15","modified_gmt":"2014-07-25T15:17:15","slug":"house-financial-services-committee-issues-staff-report-criticizing-dodd-frank-hearing-to-follow","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/2014\/07\/23\/house-financial-services-committee-issues-staff-report-criticizing-dodd-frank-hearing-to-follow\/","title":{"rendered":"House Financial Services Committee Issues Staff Report Criticizing Dodd-Frank; Hearing to Follow"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The House Committee on Financial Services published a report by the Republican staff on the Committee,  titled &#8220;Failing to End &#8216;Too Big to Fail,'&#8221; which assesses the Dodd-Frank Act&#8217;s &#8220;too big to fail&#8221; provisions.<!-- break --><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"Body\"> <\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"Body\">The report reviewed factors that led to the financial crisis in 2008 and the conduct of the government in alleviating the crisis, including the steps that it took to &#8220;bail out&#8221; various financial institutions. According to the report, financial experts, regulators and market participants now agree that Dodd-Frank failed to accomplish its goals, particularly the goal of eliminating &#8220;too big to fail.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"Body\"> <\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"Body\">With regard to Title I, the report found that: (i) FSOC is inefficient and a source of systemic risk; (ii) the Office of Financial Research has failed to identify or mitigate risks to the financial system, and failed its first high-profile test; and (iii) living wills do not solve the problem of &#8220;too big to fail&#8221; and may not be effective if used during a financial crisis.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"Body\"> <\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"Body\">With regard to Title II, the report found that: (i) the &#8220;Orderly Liquidation Authority&#8221; makes bailouts more likely in the future; (ii) the means by which the &#8220;Orderly Liquidation Authority&#8221; would prevent bailouts have never been explained and their effectiveness is in serious doubt; and (iii) the &#8220;Single Point of Entry&#8221; potentially could institutionalize AIG-style bailouts and encourage recklessness.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"Body\"> <\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"Body\">On July 23, 2014, the House Financial Services Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing, titled &#8220;Assessing the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act Four Years Later,&#8221; regarding the findings outlined in the Report. The following witnesses are scheduled to testify:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"Body\">Barney Frank, former Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services;<\/li>\n<li class=\"Body\">Anthony J. Carfang, Partner, Treasury Strategies, Inc.;<\/li>\n<li class=\"Body\">Thomas C. Deas, Vice President and Treasurer, FMC Corporation, on behalf of the Coalition for Derivatives End Users;<\/li>\n<li class=\"Body\">Paul H. Kupiec, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; and<\/li>\n<li class=\"Body\">Dale K. Wilson, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, First State Bank.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p class=\"Action_Box\"><span class=\"Subheader\">Lofchie Comment:<\/span> <span class=\"Body\">The report is effectively divided into three parts. The first part asks whether &#8220;deregulation&#8221; of financial markets caused the financial crisis. The second part asks whether the U.S. government acted wisely in &#8220;bailing out&#8221; various financial institutions, or whether these institutions should have been left to fail. The third part asks whether particular institutions and procedures created by Dodd-Frank (the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the Office of Financial Research and the creation of living wills) have been successful to date.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"Body\">The first section of the report provides a brief assessment of the causes of the financial crisis (which differs from the view of the Congress that adopted Dodd-Frank). In particular, the report disputes the notion that deregulation caused the crisis. Speaking as a financial regulatory lawyer, I think that the House report has a far stronger position than the adherents to the view that deregulation caused the crisis. During my entire career as a financial regulatory lawyer, the amount of financial regulation has steadily increased (which the report demonstrates). (A number of commenters and politicians have suggested that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act was deregulatory in that it allowed the combined operation of banks and securities firms. In fact, banks and securities firms were affiliated long before Glass-Steagall was repealed, and the repeal was not necessary for their affiliation.)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"Body\"><span class=\"Body\">Arguably, t<\/span>his first section of the report is also critical of the regulators for failing to anticipate the financial crisis. Perhaps a gentler reading of the report would be that the regulators should concede they were not successful in anticipating the prior financial crisis. (On one issue, I am going to defend the regulators: I don&#8217;t think it is fair to criticize the SEC for failure to regulate the <\/span><span class=\"Body\"><span class=\"Body\">capital <\/span>of holding companies of broker-dealers properly before the financial crisis. The SEC&#8217;s authority in this regard was extremely limited; it was more akin to a right to observe and was not at all comparable to the authority that the Federal Reserve has and maintains over bank-holding companies).<\/span> <br \/><span class=\"Body\"><br \/>The second section of the report essentially argues that the U.S. government should not have &#8220;bailed out&#8221; Bear Stearns or other financial institutions during the crisis. <\/span><span class=\"Body\"><span class=\"Body\">Obviously, t<\/span>here is no way to prove that, <\/span><span class=\"Body\"><span class=\"Body\">in retrospect,<\/span> one course of action would have been preferable to another. That said, my personal belief <\/span><span class=\"Body\">is that the bailout was the correct course of action. Had the government not stepped in to provide liquidity and support of various kinds,&nbsp;an extremely high number of financial institutions in the&nbsp;United States (and abroad) would (or perhaps would) have failed. The problem was not that some particular entity was &#8220;too big to fail.&#8221; It was that the value of assets (particularly real estate assets) crashed and no liquidity was available for financing. Had a few more financial institutions failed, asset values would have crashed further and liquidity may have stopped <\/span><span class=\"Body\"><span class=\"Body\">entirely \u2013 <em>i.e.<\/em>, creating systemic shocks beyond even the dramatic ones we saw during the crisis<\/span>.<\/span><br \/><span class=\"Body\"><br \/>The third section of the report provides forceful criticism by the Republican majority staff of the Financial Services Committee on FSOC, OFR and living wills. While I will not summarize these criticisms, my view has been that (i) these provisions are not well-founded, (ii) that these Dodd-Frank-created entities are not off to a good start, and (iii) their structure and purposes should be subject to reconsideration.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p class=\"Comment_Box\"><span class=\"Subheader\">See:<\/span><span class=\"Body\"> <a href=\"http:\/\/financialservices.house.gov\/uploadedfiles\/071814_tbtf_report_final.pdf\">Report: Filing to End &#8220;Too Big to Fail&#8221;<\/a>; <a href=\"http:\/\/financialservices.house.gov\/news\/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=388511\">Report: Dodd-Frank Does Not End Too Big to Fail<\/a>; <a href=\"http:\/\/financialservices.house.gov\/calendar\/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=388239\">Hearing Announcement and Witness List<\/a>.<br \/><span class=\"Subheader\">See also:<\/span> <a href=\"http:\/\/financialservices.house.gov\/news\/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=388688\">Financial Services Committee to Hear from Main Street Economy Voices at Dodd-Frank Anniversary Hearing<\/a>; <a href=\"http:\/\/financialservices.house.gov\/blog\/?postid=388641\">Rep. Jeb Hensarling Article, &#8220;Derailing the American Dream Since 2010: Thanks a lot, Dodd-Frank<\/a>.&#8221; <\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The House Committee on Financial Services published a report by the Republican staff on the Committee, titled &#8220;Failing to End &#8216;Too Big to Fail,&#8217;&#8221; which assesses the Dodd-Frank Act&#8217;s &#8220;too big to fail&#8221; provisions. The report reviewed factors that led &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/2014\/07\/23\/house-financial-services-committee-issues-staff-report-criticizing-dodd-frank-hearing-to-follow\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,40,9,33],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4829","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bankcap","category-banking-and-shadow-banking","category-reg","category-systemic-risk"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4829","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4829"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4829\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4831,"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4829\/revisions\/4831"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4829"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4829"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centerforfinancialstability.org\/wp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4829"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}