CFTC Chair Unveils New Measure of Swaps Market Size and Risk

CFTC Chair J. Christopher Giancarlo introduced a new measure for the size of the rates segment of the swaps markets and called for a new “paradigm” in describing that market.

In remarks delivered at Derivcon 2018 in New York, Mr. Giancarlo characterized notional value as a highly flawed metric for the size and risk of the swap market, and emphasized that reliance on the metric for regulatory purposes leads to poor allocation of public resources. In particular, he noted that the common use of notional amounts in public discourse without normalizing for duration or offsetting positions creates an impression that the market is much larger than it is in actual risk terms, and has led to misguided policy decisions.

Mr. Giancarlo unveiled a new metric for measuring the size of the rate swap markets developed by CFTC Chief Economist Bruce Tuckman. This measure would evaluate market size based on entity-netted notionals (“ENNs”), which are produced by converting notional amounts for rate swaps of all durations into five-year risk equivalents, and then netting long and short exposures in the same currency between pairs of market participants. Mr. Giancarlo explained that ENNs are designed to describe the amount of market risk transfer in the interest rate swaps markets. Using this method of calculating risk, the aggregate risk transfer amount is sized much more consistently with other major markets, such as the debt market, and can be evaluated accordingly.

Mr. Giancarlo encouraged consideration of the ENN including its potential uses for regulation, but noted that his intention was not to come up with a specific alternative to the current swap dealer de minimis calculation methodology. He also emphasized that ENNs are not intended to quantify credit or operational risk.

Lofchie Comment: Query whether the new measure will be adopted by those who believe that there is a political advantage in exaggerating the size of the swaps market? It sounds a lot more ominous to describe a swap as having a billion dollar notional than it does to describe it as having a four dollars and thirty-seven cents market value.


SEC Requests Comments on Form PF

The SEC is requesting comment on the collection of information on Form PF (“Reporting Form for Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors”). All private fund advisers with at least $150 million in private assets under management are required to complete Form PF. The form is intended to aid the Financial Stability Oversight Council in monitoring systemic risk, and in allocating its regulatory tools for nonbank financial companies.

The SEC is requesting comments on (i) the necessity of information collection, (ii) the accuracy of the SEC’s reporting burden estimates, (iii) how to enhance the quality, utility and clarity of information requested, and (iv) how to minimize the burden of information collection.

Comments must be submitted by March 11, 2017.

Lofchie Comment: Form PF is fundamentally useless. (See, OFR Researchers Question the Utility of SEC Form PF as a Risk Management Tool.) The financial industry spent hundreds of millions of dollars developing systems to answer questions that were poorly considered and written. Anyone familiar with the relevant area of law could see that the questions posed on the form could not possibly generate useful or consistent results. Leaving aside the time and money wasted, if one believes that the information properly collected might have been useful to the regulators, then the waste was even greater, because an opportunity to acquire useful information was squandered. The real question for regulators now is how can they improve their procedures so as not to make a similar mistake or squander additional resources.

Global Markets into 2018

The Center for Financial Stability (CFS) hosted a small private workshop for leaders in finance to delve into issues that will shape the future of asset values and investment management on December 6.

CFS Special Counselor Jack Malvey set the stage with an essay “Toward the Mid-21 st Century Global Financial System” –

Workshop topics included:

– Geopolitics and Big Picture Challenges through 2020 – AI, cyber, etc;
– Global Macro, Quantitative Tightening, and Financial Stability;
– Financial Industry Transitions – Active versus Passive Management, etc; and
– Opportunities and Risks (a selection follows).


– Buy cash today – the rate of return will be extraordinarily high.
– Central banks will more actively incorporate financial stability into actions and mandates.
– Emerging markets will outperform.
– The Fed desires to move further away from the zero lower bound.
– NPLs in China are overstated / bank earnings mitigate and neutralize risks.
– Global macro investment opportunities via uneven tightening.


– I will buy cash – but tomorrow.
– Bitcoin correction.
– Limited attractive equity names based on valuation / similar to Tokyo in 1989.
– Geopolitical tensions will increase with North Korea, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
– Inflation surprise / data may be misread.
– Artificial intelligence channeled for ill.

Best wishes into the Holiday Season and 2018!

OCC Releases Semiannual Risk Report

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) described the principal risks facing national banks and federal savings associations in its Semiannual Risk Perspective for Spring 2017 (the “Report”).

In the Report, the OCC identified the following key risk themes:

  • strategic risk due to a changing regulatory climate, low interest rates and competition from nonfinancial firms, including fintech companies;
  • increased credit risk and relaxed underwriting standards due to strong risk appetite and competitive pressures;
  • elevated operational risk as a result of increased reliance on third-party service providers and attendant cybersecurity risks; and
  • high compliance risk as banks navigate money laundering risks and new consumer protection requirements.

OCC supervisory priorities for the next 12 months will remain broadly the same as in 2016 and will include the objective of identifying and assigning regulatory ratings and risk assessments. The OCC also pledged a continued commitment to monitoring and evaluating risks presented by third-party service providers.

In remarks on the Report, Acting Comptroller of the Currency Keith A. Noreika stated:

“The OCC employs a risk-focused approach to supervision, and tailors examination strategies to the individual risks of each of its supervised institutions and will pay close attention to these key risk areas over the next six months.”


Lofchie Comment: A material portion of the “risk” that banks face, according to the report, is regulatory risk. The Comptroller’s remark that “[m]ultiple new or amended regulations are posing challenges” to banks and the financial system also echoes the comment made by the SEC’s Investor Advocate in his recent report to Congress that he would “encourage Congress to consider giving the [SEC] a respite from statutory mandates” (at 3). It is clear that the very rate and extent of regulatory change has itself become a threat to the financial system.

FRB Governor Powell Examines Liquidity Risks in Central Clearing

At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Symposium on Central Clearing, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”) Governor Jerome H. Powell detailed the risks faced by central counterparties (“CCPs”) and their members.

Because they advocated for central clearing, Mr. Powell noted, global authorities (i) have a responsibility to make sure that CCPs do not become a point of failure in the system and (ii) must ensure that bank capital rules do not discourage central clearing.

Regarding bank capital, Mr. Powell argued that the supplementary leverage ratio for U.S. global systemically important banks fails to account for the relatively low risk of central clearing, as compared to riskier activities, and could discourage central clearing. He explained that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is considering a “risk-sensitive” approach to evaluating counterparty credit risk for certain centrally cleared derivatives, which could help to encourage central clearing. He also noted that the FRB is considering implementing a “settlement-to-market” approach for some cleared derivatives that would treat daily variation margin as a settlement payment, which means that banks would not have to hold capital against it.

On the subject of liquidity, Mr. Powell outlined the risks associated with central clearing. He noted the challenges that CCPs face with regard to outgoing and incoming payment flows. In the event of a member default, for instance, CCPs would need to be able to convert large amounts of non-cash collateral into cash in order to make payments to non-defaulting parties. For that reason, they must have lines of credit and ready access to the repurchase market. Mr. Powell’s example of a payment flow challenge led him to consider where CCPs should store their available cash. He mentioned central bank deposits as a safe and flexible option.

Mr. Powell also described the risks associated with incoming payment flows. Market volatility can trigger events that lead to an abnormal number of margin calls, which, in the first instance, requires liquidity on the part of clearing members to meet the margin call. It also requires a series of payments to be made simultaneously, so that the CCPs can obtain funds from the settlement bank quickly to meet margin requirements for its members. (In most instances, clearing members have an hour to meet intraday margin calls.) By way of example, Mr. Powell noted that data from the CFTC suggests that the top five CCPs requested $27 billion in additional margin over the two days following the Brexit referendum, which is about five times the average amount. Fortunately, members and CCPs were prepared in that instance, and were able to make the necessary payments.

In order to manage liquidity risk, Mr. Powell suggested, regulators should conduct expanded stress tests for CCPs:

“Conducting supervisory stress tests on CCPs that take liquidity risks into account would help authorities better assess the resilience of the financial system. A stress test focused on cross-CCP liquidity risks could help to identify assumptions that are not mutually consistent; for example, if each CCP’s plans involve liquidating Treasuries, is it realistic to believe that every CCP could do so simultaneously?”

He also urged regulators to (i) facilitate innovations that help to reduce liquidity risks, such as exploring the utilization of distributed ledger technology, (ii) make Federal Reserve bank accounts available to major CCPs, and (iii) take global market implications into account when developing solutions for managing liquidity risk for CCPs.

Lofchie Comment: The CFTC and the banking industry have long argued that the Basel III capital rules that require banks to reserve against collateral posted to a central clearing agency are mistaken. Governor Powell is coming around belatedly to that view. The existence of central clearing parties does not decentralize risk; it concentrates it. Yet a further risk of clearing emphasized in Governor Powell’s remarks is the power that the clearing agencies have to suck tremendous amounts of liquidity out of the market: $27 billion of additional margin in the two days following Brexit. (What this means is that, in demanding more margin to protect their own liquidity in a financial crisis, clearing agencies may bring down everyone else.)

It is certainly time for a full review of the benefits and risks of central clearing. Many of the concerns raised by clearing skeptics are being proved valid.

NY Fed Bank President Says It’s Time to Evaluate Post-Crisis Regulatory Regime, Questions Effectiveness of Volcker Rule

Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“NY Fed”) President and CEO William C. Dudley articulated several principles to consider when evaluating the post-financial crisis regulatory regime and raised questions about the effectiveness of the Volcker Rule.

Mr. Dudley stated that the financial crisis exposed flaws in the regulatory framework – in particular, capital and liquidity inadequacies at large financial institutions. He cited “a number of important structural weaknesses that made it vulnerable to stress” including: (i) systemically important firms operating without sufficient capital and liquidity buffers, (ii) risk monitoring, measuring and controlling failures, (iii) significant problems in funding and derivatives markets, and (iv) fundamental defects in the securitization markets. These weaknesses, he noted, were “magnified by the lack of a good resolution process for large, complex financial firms that got into trouble.”

Mr. Dudley argued that while the industry “must resolve to never allow a return to [pre-crisis] conditions,” now is an appropriate time to begin evaluating the changes that were made to the regulatory regime. He articulated three principles to keep in mind for an effective regulatory regime:

  1. “Ensure that all financial institutions that are systemically important have enough capital and liquidity so that their risk of failure is very low, regardless of the economic environment.”
  2. “Have an effective resolution regime that allows such firms to fail without threatening to take down the rest of the nation’s financial system, and without requiring taxpayer support.”
  3. Ensure that the financial system remains resilient to shocks by preserving “the centralized clearing of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, better supervision and oversight of key financial market utilities, and the reforms of the money market mutual fund industry and the tri-party repurchase funding (“repo”) system.”

Mr. Dudley suggested that regulatory and compliance burdens could be made “considerably lighter” on smaller and medium-sized banking institutions because “the failure of such a firm will not impose large costs or stress on the broader financial system.”

Mr. Dudley also questioned whether the implementation of the Volcker Rule was achieving its policy objectives. Regulating entities under the Volcker Rule is difficult, he argued, because most market-making activity has “an element of proprietary trading” and the division between market-making and proprietary trading is “not always clear-cut.” Mr. Dudley said that while the evidence may be inconclusive, the Volcker Rule could be responsible for a decline in market liquidity of corporate bonds. Mr. Dudley strongly recommended Volcker exemptions for community banks.

Lofchie Comment: Mr. Dudley notes that the profitability of banks has dropped in light of their reduced leverage, but he asserts that they remain “profitable enough to cover their cost of capital.” What makes this remark particularly notable is the contrasting recent assertion of FDIC Vice-Chair Thomas Hoenig who claimed that (i) banks’ return on equity was low because they were too highly leveraged (a completely counterintuitive assertion that Mr. Hoenig did not fully explain) and (ii) that banks were less profitable than essentially every other industry (which would seem to suggest that banks were not profitable enough to cover their costs of capital, or at least that investors’ capital was better deployed elsewhere). Whatever is causing the decline in bank profitability (leverage too high or leverage too low), bank regulators should worry that the firms that they regulate are not making enough money to sustain themselves for the long term.

NASAA Warns Financial CHOICE Act Moves in “Wrong Direction”

In testimony submitted to the House Financial Services Committee (“Committee”), North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) President Mike Rothman argued that the updated Financial CHOICE Act should not be passed in its current form. Mr. Rothman objected to bill provisions related to enforcement and regulatory authority, capital formation, and investor protection.

At a hearing before the Committee, Chair Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) introduced the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017. As previously discussed, this bill is an update of the CHOICE Act of 2016 (see the Committee’s summary of changes) and represents a major overhaul of the current financial services regulatory regime including a partial repeal of Dodd-Frank.

Mr. Rothman testified that the proposed Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 would weaken important reforms and protections, undermine regulators’ ability to enforce financial laws, and “dramatically change regulatory policies in the wrong direction.” He argued that state securities regulators are concerned the bill would unnecessarily expose investors and markets to significant new risks, and replace efficient protections with ineffective measures:

“By attempting to eviscerate so many critically important reforms – weakened oversight of private securities markets and reforms; watered down provisions intended to expand fiduciary obligations to investment professionals; lowered standards for securities sold to the investing public; diluted rules that keep “bad actors” out of our securities markets, among many others – the legislation blithely aims to sweep away in one stroke scores of essential protections and modernizations to our financial regulatory architecture. . . .”

Specifically, Mr. Rothman noted objection to Section 391 of the proposed legislation. He argued that NASAA objects to a mandate governing the coordination of state and federal enforcement actions because it would hamper the voluntary state-federal collaborative framework that is in place already.

Lofchie Comment: CHOICE Act Section 391 requires that various federal agencies (which are enumerated in Section 311 of the bill, but essentially includes the major U.S. financial regulators) better coordinate among themselves which agency should be the lead in any regulatory action where numerous agencies are involved. It does not, by its terms, impose any obligations on state regulators; it merely requires that the federal government act as a unified entity (which would seem entirely sensible, would conserve the government’s resources, and would reduce the nightmare scenario of a business dealing with multiple regulators in regard to any one single issue). The Section does not require the states to coordinate either among themselves or with the federal government, although it would be good if they were to do so.

FRB Governor Jerome Powell Applauds “Aggressive Response” to Financial Crisis, Calls for Some Adjustments

Federal Reserve System (“FRB”) Governor Jerome Powell reviewed the regulatory response to the global financial crisis and offered his perspective on the state of current financial market infrastructure and possible regulatory adjustments going forward.

In a speech before the Global Finance Forum, Mr. Powell praised those who aggressively responded to the financial crisis as having prevented another depression. At the time, he noted, the two primary tasks were to “get the economy growing again” and address the “many structural weaknesses” in the financial system. Mr. Powell noted that while job growth has been strong and the U.S. has not had another recession, there has been a labor productivity slowdown associated with “weak investment and a decline in output gains from technological innovation.” To address this, Mr. Powell called for a “national focus on increasing the sustainable growth rate of our economy.”

Mr. Powell stated that the financial system has improved and stabilized primarily because of (i) higher levels of quality capital held, (ii) higher levels of liquidity held, (iii) capital stress testing, (iv) resolution planning (i.e., living wills), and (v) the “greater transparency and more consistent risk management” that comes with the central clearing of interest rate and credit default swaps. He argued that these core reforms should be protected, but called for certain regulatory adjustment in instances where new regulations have been inappropriately difficult for smaller firms or otherwise inefficient, adding:

“Some aspects of the new regulatory program are proving unnecessarily burdensome and should be better tailored to meet our objectives. Some provisions may not be needed at all given the broad scope of what we have put in place. I support adjustments designed to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation without sacrificing safety and soundness . . .”

Lofchie Comment: Mr. Powell joins a steadily increasing number of regulators who are conceding that Dodd-Frank has had some material negative effects. These concessions lay the groundwork for a rational discussion of how financial regulation may be improved – a welcome change from eight years in which “improvement in regulation” and “more regulation” were purported to be synonymous concepts.

President Trump Directs Treasury Secretary to Reconsider Two Dodd-Frank Authorities

In two executive memoranda, President Donald J. Trump directed the U.S. Department of the Treasury to review key elements of the Dodd-Frank post-crisis regulation. The memoranda authorizes the Treasury Secretary to review (i) the processes of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) for designating “systemically important” institutions, and (ii) the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) including a review of potentially adverse consequences posed by the framework.

In a statement, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said that during the review process, the Treasury will not designate any new non-bank financial institutions as systemically important under the FSOC. The goal of the review, he said, is to “make this a smarter, more effective process that reduces the kinds of systemic risk that harmed so many Americans during the financial crisis of 2008.”

Secretary Mnuchin said that the review of the OLA will attempt to determine (i) whether the OLA is encouraging “inappropriate risk-taking,” (ii) “the extent of taxpayer liability,” and (iii) how the bankruptcy code “may be a more appropriate avenue of resolving financial distress.”

President Trump remarked:

“I’m . . . issuing two directives that instruct Secretary Mnuchin to review the damaging Dodd-Frank regulations that failed to hold Wall Street firms accountable. . . . These regulations enshrine ‘too big to fail’ and encourage risky behavior.”


Lofchie Comment: Politically, these executive actions are promoted as being for the purpose of holding Wall Street accountable. The larger benefit they provide is to put a check on the very broad discretionary powers afforded the government under Dodd-Frank. These executive actions move financial regulation back toward a system of rules governed by written procedures and not by grants of broad discretion.

House Republicans Release Revised CHOICE Act

House Republicans released the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017. The bill is an update of the CHOICE Act of 2016. The new version represents a major overhaul of the current financial services regulatory regime including a partial repeal of Dodd-Frank.

In September 2016, the House Financial Services Committee approved the initial version of the CHOICE Act by a vote of 30 to 26. At a hearing scheduled for April 26, 2017, the Committee will discuss the updated version of the bill. Proposed changes to the current financial regulatory regime include, among other things:

  1. an opt-out of many regulatory requirements for banks and other financial institutions if they maintain a 10% leverage ratio (among other conditions);
  2. subjecting the federal banking agencies to greater congressional oversight and tighter budgetary control;
  3. materially reducing the authority of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the establishment of a new process of identifying financial institutions as “systemically important”;
  4. a repeal of the Orderly Liquidation Authority and the creation of a new bankruptcy process for banks;
  5. reforms in bank stress tests;
  6. a restructuring of the CFPB, FHFA, OCC, and FDIC into bipartisan commissions appointed by the President;
  7. the elimination of the CFPB supervisory and examination authority;
  8. a repeal of the Volcker Rule; and
  9. facilitated capital raising by small companies, including through crowd-funding.

The Committee released a summary of changes.

Regarding derivatives, the new legislation exempts certain inter-affiliate swaps from nearly all Title VII requirements (except reporting), and otherwise removes a number of changes to Title VII that were previously included (it is suggested that this is because such provisions would be addressed in CFTC reauthorization legislation).

Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) called the bill a solution that “grows our economy from Main Street up.” He asserted that the CHOICE Act is premised on the principles that all banks need to be well-capitalized and that community banks and credit unions deserve relief from the “crushing burden of over-regulation.”

Lofchie Comment: Changes that the bill would make in the regulatory process are genuinely significant. These are largely in Title III of the proposal (see page 104).

Under the terms of the bill, the various financial regulators (including the banking regulators, the CFTC and the SEC) would be prohibited from issuing a “regulation” (which term would be broadly defined) unless the regulator first issued a statement (i) stating the need for the regulation, (ii) explaining why the private market could not address the problem, (iii) analyzing the adverse impacts of the regulation, and (iv) attempting to quantify the costs and benefits of the regulation, including its effects on economic activity, the basis for its determinations, and, most significantly, “an explanation of predicted changes” that will be brought about by the regulation.  A final rulemaking would be required to include “regulatory impact metrics selected by the [regulator’s] chief economist.”

Adherence to this process would make the tasks of the regulator materially more difficult, or at least it would make it more difficult for the regulators to pass rules. Of course, there is a significant amount of good in that. Regulators should be subject to a reasonably high burden of consideration in adopting rules that may cost market participants, in the aggregate, millions of dollars in compliance costs or that have negative effects on the economy generally.

One of the most interesting provisions of the bill is the requirement that regulators should provide an explanation of predicted changes that will result from the rule. Doubtless, in many cases, the predictions will turn out to be wrong. But that is ok. It is unreasonable to expect that regulators will be always, or even that consistently, correct in their predictions. The new standard may be hard to assess, but the attempt is still worthwhile.