CFTC Issues Guidance to Exchanges and Clearinghouses on Virtual Currency Derivative Product Listings

The CFTC issued staff guidance to exchanges and clearinghouses to “ensure proper surveillance and oversight of the trading and clearing of virtual currency contracts.”

The CFTC stated that virtual currencies “are unlike any commodity that the CFTC has dealt with in the past.” The CFTC cited heightened risks and a lack of transparency and susceptibility to market manipulation as causes for concern about how virtual currency derivative products may impact the commodities markets. As a result of these risks, the CFTC identified several areas that demand greater attention from designated contract markets (“DCMs”), swap execution facilities (“SEFs”) and derivatives clearing organizations (“DCOs”). As described in the advisory, the CFTC set the following expectations:

  • Enhanced Market Surveillance. The CFTC expects exchanges to enter into information-sharing agreements with spot markets for virtual currency products in order to facilitate access to trade data. The CFTC heightened its expectations for the monitoring of “relevant data feeds” from the underlying spot markets. The CFTC expects that exchange-listed virtual currency contracts should be based on spot markets that adhere to federal anti-money laundering regulations.
  • Close Coordination with the CFTC Surveillance Group. The CFTC expects exchanges to regularly coordinate with CFTC staff regarding the surveillance of virtual currency derivative contracts, provide certain trade data to CFTC staff upon request, and coordinate with staff regarding the timing of new virtual currency derivative listings.
  • Large Trader Reporting. The CFTC recommends that exchanges implement a large trader reporting threshold for virtual currency derivative contracts at “five bitcoin” or the “equivalent for other virtual currencies.” This threshold could help to better identify traders who are engaging in virtual currency-related market manipulation.
  • Outreach to Members and Market Participants. The CFTC expects exchanges to “meaningfully” engage with stakeholders in the lead-up to new virtual currency derivative product listings. This includes the expectation that exchanges will solicit comments from stakeholders not only on contract terms and vulnerability to market manipulation, but also on the impact on clearing members and futures commission merchants. The CFTC also expects exchanges to share feedback from market participants with CFTC staff.
  • DCO Risk Management. The CFTC expects a DCO to submit to CFTC staff proposed initial margin requirements and other relevant information concerning a proposed virtual currency derivative contracts. CFTC staff also expects DCOs to explain their consideration of stakeholders’ views in approving proposed contracts.

The CFTC explained that in the event that a self-certified virtual currency derivative contract raises concerns, the CFTC will provide a notice to the exchanges regarding its concerns as to compliance with the CEA and CFTC rules.

CFTC Commissioners Have Different Wish Lists

In separate remarks at the FIA 40th Annual Law and Compliance Conference, CFTC Commissioners Brian Quintenz and Rostin Behnam described their respective regulatory priorities in contrasting terms.

Commissioner Quintenz advocated for concerted efforts to accomplish harmonization between SEC and CFTC swap regulation. According to Mr. Quintenz, firms that register as both swap dealers and securities-based swap dealers with the CFTC and the SEC, respectively, should be subject to different regulatory requirements only when there are “irreconcilable difference[s] between the securities and derivatives markets.” Further, Mr. Quintenz emphasized the importance of pushing for full harmonization where possible, noting that small differences often lead to a large cost for compliance. As to CPO/CTA registration for registered investment advisers, SEFs and data reporting, Mr. Quintenz argued that deference to the rules of the other agency may be appropriate. A firm engaged in trading and reporting swaps and security-based swaps should follow “one set of rules, instead of two,” he argued.

While Commissioner Behnam also spoke about SEC/CFTC harmonization, he emphasized more broadly that CFTC Chair J. Christopher Giancarlo’s agenda for regulatory change was overly ambitious. In Mr. Behnam’s words:

We’ve been waiting for deliverables in terms of Project KISS, Reg. Reform 2.0, and CFTC and SEC harmonization, and anticipating resolution of unfinished business in terms of the de Minimis exception, position limits, capital, and Regulation Automated Trading (Reg. AT). Since that time, we’ve received the Chairman’s white paper on “Swaps Regulation Version 2.0,” which purports to set the agenda for Reg. Reform 2.0. While I appreciate the Chairman’s transparency in setting forth his vision and, in his words, starting a dialogue, I can’t help but note that there is already a process for dialogue with market participants regarding potential rule changes – the notice and comment process for proposed rules under the Administrative Procedure Act. Adding another white paper just pushes back the timeline for getting to actual deliverables. It adds another step to the process. It also takes a lot of staff time when budgets are tight.

Commissioner Behnam went on to say: “If [CFTC] staff is directed to focus on reworking the broader framework for the swaps market in lieu of fine-tuning and building on the progress we’ve made since 2008, we risk creating greater uncertainty and impracticability at increased costs to market participants.”

Lofchie Comment: While one can be sympathetic to Commissioner Behnam’s skepticism of the need for regulatory change, and that such change itself can be costly, sufficient time has now passed since Dodd-Frank was adopted to evaluate many of the rule changes. Many of the rule changes have not only not produced the suggested benefits, but have had a negative impact on liquidity, have increased market fragmentation, and have materially increased costs to end users. Particularly given the tremendous speed with which the swap rules were adopted, and given that there is now sufficient data to evaluate at least some of the results that they have produced, there seems a great benefit in the rethinking suggested by Chair Giancarlo and CFTC Chief Economist Bruce Tuckman. It should also be noted that many of the observations made by Chair Giancarlo had also been raised by him when he was a Commissioner, but had not received the attention that they merited or the discussion that they deserved and now hopefully will receive.

CFTC Chair Unveils New Measure of Swaps Market Size and Risk

CFTC Chair J. Christopher Giancarlo introduced a new measure for the size of the rates segment of the swaps markets and called for a new “paradigm” in describing that market.

In remarks delivered at Derivcon 2018 in New York, Mr. Giancarlo characterized notional value as a highly flawed metric for the size and risk of the swap market, and emphasized that reliance on the metric for regulatory purposes leads to poor allocation of public resources. In particular, he noted that the common use of notional amounts in public discourse without normalizing for duration or offsetting positions creates an impression that the market is much larger than it is in actual risk terms, and has led to misguided policy decisions.

Mr. Giancarlo unveiled a new metric for measuring the size of the rate swap markets developed by CFTC Chief Economist Bruce Tuckman. This measure would evaluate market size based on entity-netted notionals (“ENNs”), which are produced by converting notional amounts for rate swaps of all durations into five-year risk equivalents, and then netting long and short exposures in the same currency between pairs of market participants. Mr. Giancarlo explained that ENNs are designed to describe the amount of market risk transfer in the interest rate swaps markets. Using this method of calculating risk, the aggregate risk transfer amount is sized much more consistently with other major markets, such as the debt market, and can be evaluated accordingly.

Mr. Giancarlo encouraged consideration of the ENN including its potential uses for regulation, but noted that his intention was not to come up with a specific alternative to the current swap dealer de minimis calculation methodology. He also emphasized that ENNs are not intended to quantify credit or operational risk.

Lofchie Comment: Query whether the new measure will be adopted by those who believe that there is a political advantage in exaggerating the size of the swaps market? It sounds a lot more ominous to describe a swap as having a billion dollar notional than it does to describe it as having a four dollars and thirty-seven cents market value.

 

European Commission Recognizes U.S. DCMs and SEFs as “Equivalent”

The European Commission (“EC”) announced a decision recognizing certain CFTC-regulated DCMs and SEFs as “eligible for compliance” with EU trading obligations for certain derivatives. CFTC staff recommended that the CFTC adopt a similar order exempting EU-authorized trading facilities from U.S. registration requirements. The decisions follow the recent agreement between the CFTC and EC to adopt a “common approach” to derivatives trading on certain platforms.

According to the EC, this recognition will allow for EU counterparties to trade derivatives on CFTC-authorized designated contract markets (“DCMs”) and swap execution facilities (“SEFs”) based in the United States. In accordance with the decision, traders will be able to use U.S. trading platforms for such transactions even as MiFID II (and its derivatives trading obligation) becomes applicable on January 3, 2018. The trading obligation will require certain derivatives transactions to be executed on EU venues or venues designated as equivalent by the EC. The European Commission noted that its decision does not affect the ability of EU counterparties to trade on CFTC-regulated DCMs and SEFs with respect to derivatives that are not subject to the EU trading obligation.

CFTC Chair J. Christopher Giancarlo urged his fellow commissioners to “act expeditiously in approving” an exemptive order for EU trading facilities. CFTC Director of the Division of Market Oversight Amir Zaidi added that the CFTC is “close behind” with its own order.

Lofchie Comment: This is a significant success. CFTC Chair Giancarlo had, at once, both reached out to the Europeans in regard to the mutual acceptance of “comparable regulations” and cautioned the Europeans against imposing regulatory requirements that would disadvantage U.S. financial intermediaries.  See CFTC Chair J. Christopher Giancarlo Criticizes “EU Plan to Invade U.S. Markets.”

CFTC Commissioner Behnam Evaluates Implementation of Derivatives Reforms

Commissioner Rostin Behnam identified four key reform priorities: mandatory clearing, exchange trading of standardized swaps, swap data reporting, and capital and margin requirements for non-centrally cleared swaps.

In remarks at the Georgetown Center for Financial Markets and Policy, Commissioner Behnam expressed support for the “broad policy objectives” in Title VII of Dodd-Frank and said that the CFTC acted as a “leader” in implementing over-the-counter derivatives reforms in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. He acknowledged that these changes have come with “costs and unintended consequences,” and expressed support for ongoing regulatory adjustments.

Commissioner Behnam identified four key reform priorities:

  • Mandatory clearing of swaps: Commissioner Behnam said that the clearing mandate has been largely successful, but questioned the size and interconnectedness of clearinghouses, and whether the clearing mandate and higher capital and margin requirements for uncleared swaps have “disincentivized risk management.” He said that the CFTC will evaluate the potential systemic effects of the clearing mandate, and that he will seek to bolster regulations to promote a safer clearing ecosystem.
  • Exchange trading of standardized swaps: Mr. Behnam noted the unintended consequences of the CFTC’s trading rules that have caused concerns as to market fragmentation and liquidity.
  • Swap data reporting: Mr. Behnam argued that the CFTC needs to develop requirements that establish “clear parameters” for data collection and submission, including when data must be submitted, as well as what form the data must take. He stressed the need for data set uniformity, both across the CFTC and with international regulators.
  • Capital and margin requirements for non-centrally cleared swaps: Noting that the CFTC has yet to adopt capital requirements for swap dealers, Mr. Behnam urged the CFTC to develop tools to monitor market resiliency, safety and liquidity in times of stress.

Mr. Behnam also highlighted three ongoing issues at the CFTC: enforcement, international cooperation and technology. In each case, he expressed general support for ongoing initiatives. As sponsor of the Market Risk Advisory Committee, Commissioner Behnam said he will engage in a “listening tour” to hear perspectives on risk management from market participants, regulators and other interested parties.

Lofchie Comment: Commissioner Behnam’s first published speech covers a lot of ground, but does not suggest that there are new initiatives that he will spearhead or that there are current initiatives that he opposes. Instead, Mr. Behnam indicates he will be in observation mode for the first part of his tenure.

In many ways, Mr. Behnam’s speech is similar to the speech given by CFTC Chair J. Christopher Giancarlo on Monday. Both Mr. Giancarlo and Mr. Behnam expressed broad support for the policy aims of Title VII of Dodd-Frank while noting a number of ways in which the current derivatives regulatory framework can be upgraded (including a handful of shared takes). One important difference may be that Chair Giancarlo believes that there were substantial problems with the CFTC’s prior rulemakings. Commissioner Benham’s remarks seem to suggest a position closer to those of former CFTC Chair Timothy Massad, who referenced the need only to “fine tune” the CFTC Title VII rules. Chair Massad never conceded the existence of material issues or attempted any significant revisions to existing rules. Given that Commissioner Benham was last in the office of Senator Stabenow (D. from Michigan), it is reasonable to expect that Chair Giancarlo intends a more ambitious clean-up of the CFTC’s rules than former Chair Massad attempted or than Commissioner Benham may be willing to support.

MFA Recommends Greater Harmonization of CFTC/EU Swaps Trading Rules

The Managed Funds Association (“MFA”) published a comparative analysis of U.S. and European Union (“EU”) derivatives trading regimes, and made recommendations for further cross-border harmonization. The MFA found the two regimes to be aligned in many important areas. The MFA identified two areas where harmonization could be improved: (1) the calibration of the transparency regime in the EU, and (2) whether prearranged trading is permitted for instruments subject to the trading obligation in the EU.

The MFA made the following observations and recommendations:

  • Pre-trade transparency/modes of execution: evaluate European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) “transitional transparency calculations” to ensure that liquidity classifications are appropriate and market participants receive adequate liquidity. The CFTC should consider allowing greater flexibility for execution on swap execution facilities.
  • Prohibition on prearranged trading: ensure that prearranged trading is prohibited by ESMA except for block trades.
  • Post-trade transparency: the length of public reporting delays differs between EU and U.S. regimes; ESMA should continue to evaluate transitional transparency calculations and should consider limitations on the use of the extended deferral program of four weeks.
  • Straight-through processing: given that U.S. and EU rules are substantially similar, monitor to ensure that rules are faithfully implemented by trading venues.
  • Impartial/non-discriminatory access to trading venues: given that U.S. and EU rules are substantially similar, monitor to ensure that rules are faithfully implemented by trading venues.
  • Process for determining the derivatives subject to a trading obligation: the CFTC should consider undertaking greater oversight of the “made-available-to-trade” process.
  • Scope of instruments covered by a trading obligation: instruments subject to regulation under both U.S. and EU regimes are substantially similar.
  • Access to trading venue rulebooks: EU regulators should encourage trading facilities to disclose their rulebooks to market participants.

Lofchie Comment: CFTC Chair Giancarlo favors greater flexibility as to the means by which swaps are executed. Having a buy-side group support this direction should be further proof that the Chair is going in the right direction.

Another recommendation by MFA that is worth strong support (and Congressional amendment of Dodd-Frank) is the “made available to trade” process under which an exchange can effectively force a particular type of swap to be traded on exchange (if that type of swap is centrally cleared). Giving an exchange this type of power, where the exchange may be completely self-interested in its use of this authority, is, to put it politely, a very bad idea. Only the CFTC should have the authority to force any particular type of swap to be traded only on-exchange.

CFTC, EU Make Comparability Determinations on Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps

The CFTC approved a comparability determination that European Union (“EU”) margin requirements for uncleared swaps are comparable in outcome to relevant CFTC Regulations. The European Commission announced a similar equivalence decision that the CFTC uncleared margin rules are comparable to the EU’s requirements.

The CFTC determination generally allows swap dealers that comply with the EU margin requirements, in circumstances enumerated in the CFTC Regulation 23.160, to be deemed to be in compliance with CFTC requirements. Such swap dealers would remain subject to CFTC examination and enforcement authority. CFTC Letter 17-22, which extended exemptive relief to certain swap dealers that are subject to both U.S. and European margin requirements for uncleared swaps, is no longer applicable.

In addition, the CFTC announced that the CFTC and the EC have agreed to a “common approach” for certain authorized trading venues. Under the common approach, the CFTC plans to grant relief to certain EU trading venues from the swap execution facility (“SEF”) registration requirement, provided they satisfy the “comparable and comprehensive” standard for exemptive relief under CEA Section 5h(g). The EU would propose a corresponding equivalence decision recognizing CFTC-authorized SEFs and designated contract markets as eligible venues.

CFTC Chair J. Christopher Giancarlo characterized the cooperative efforts as an important step in cross-border harmonization:

“These cross-border measures will provide certainty to market participants. It will ensure that our global markets are not stifled by fragmentation, inefficiencies, and higher costs. Indeed these measures are critical to maintaining the integrity of our swaps markets.”

 

Lofchie Comment: This is a significant step by the CFTC both in improving relationships with the Europeans and in accomplishing Chair Giancarlo’s goals of facilitating the ability of firms to transact globally and undoing the geographic market fragmentation that had resulted from the post Dodd-Frank regulatory regime.  One can guess that the Chair will next turn attention to improving the rules for trading on U.S. swap execution facilities, which will benefit the competitiveness of the United States as a financial center.

Treasury Releases Recommendations for Capital Markets Regulatory Reforms

The U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury”) released a second report pursuant to President Donald J. Trump’s Executive Order establishing core principles for improving the financial system (see coverage of first report). The new report details plans to reduce burdens of capital markets regulation (see also Fact Sheet on report).

The report recommends supporting and promoting access to capital markets, reducing regulatory costs, making changes to market structure and modifying derivatives regulation to facilitate risk transfer.

In a “Table of Recommendations” (beginning on page 205), Treasury lists proposed recommendations. Some highlights include:

  • Public Companies and IPOs (e.g., decrease the cost of being a public company by eliminating the conflict minerals rule);
  • Challenges for Smaller Public Companies (e.g., increase the level at which a company may be considered “small”);
  • Expanding Access to Capital Through Innovation (e.g., allow accredited investors to invest freely in crowdfunded offerings);
  • Maintaining the Efficacy of Private Markets (e.g., expand the definition of accredited investor);
  • Market Structure and Liquidity, Equities (e.g., allow smaller companies to limit the exchanges on which they trade to facilitate the development of centralized liquidity);
  • Market Structure and Liquidity, Treasuries (e.g., provide greater support for the repo market);
  • Market Structure and Liquidity, Corporate Bonds (e.g., improve liquidity);
  • Securitization and Capital (e.g., simplify capital regulation of banks);
  • Securitization and Liquidity (e.g., treat certain securitizations as liquid assets);
  • Securitization and Risk Retention (e.g., provide exemptions from the risk retention requirements);
  • Securitization and Disclosures (e.g., reduce the number of required reporting fields for registered deals);
  • Derivatives and Harmonization Between the CFTC and SEC (e.g., the SEC should adopt its security-based swap rules);
  • Derivatives and Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps  (e.g., there should be exemptions from initial margin requirements between bank affiliates of a bank “consistent with the margin requirements of the CFTC and the corresponding non-US requirements”);
  • Derivatives and CFTC Use of No-Action Letters (e.g., rules should be fixed so it is not necessary to rely on no-action letters);
  • Derivatives and Cross-Border Issues (e.g., the U.S. regulators should work with global regulators on issues such as privacy);
  • Derivatives and Capital Treatment in Support of Central Clearing (e.g., required capital should be reduced on centrally cleared transactions);
  • Derivatives and Swap Dealer De Minimis Threshold (e.g., there should be no reduction in the de minimis threshhold for dealer registration);
  • Derivatives and Definition of Financial Entity (e.g., modify the definition, presumably with the goal of reducing the central clearing requirement);
  • Derivatives and Position Limits (e.g., adopt rules but provide hedging exemptions);
  • Derivatives and SEF Execution Methods and MAT Process (e.g., permit a broader range of trading mechanisms);
  • Derivatives and Swap Data Reporting (e.g., improve standardization of reporting requirements);
  • Financial Market Utilities (e.g., consider providing “Fed access” to certain clearing corporations);
  • Regulatory Structure and Processes, Restoration of Exemptive Authority (e.g., restore the SEC’s and CFTC’s plenary exemptive authority under the statutes that they monitor);
  • Regulatory Structure and Processes, Improving Regulatory Policy Decision Making (e.g., adopt clear rules);
  • Regulatory Structure and Processes, Self-Regulatory Organizations (e.g., better define the roles of the SROs in rulemaking); and
  • Internal Aspects of Capital Market Regulation (e.g., U.S. regulators should seek to reach “outcomes based non discriminatory substituted compliance arrangements” with foreign regulators to mitigate “the effects of regulatory redundancy and conflict”).

Lofchie Comment: The prior Administration viewed financial markets as creators of risk that had to be controlled; this Administration appears to view financial markets as creators of growth that would benefit from decreased controls. This is simply a tremendous difference in perspective and tone.

There will and should be a fair amount of discussion over these many and specific recommendations. One broad recommendation, however, stands out: restoring to both the SEC and the CFTC complete exemptive authority as to the requirements of the statutes that they enforce. Depriving the regulators of this authority in the wake of the Congressional enthusiasm for Dodd-Frank had limited the regulators ability to fix Congressional mistakes and over-reaches in drafting. The prior Administration had simply become so locked into defending Dodd-Frank against any criticism that it had become impossible for the regulators to consider, or even discuss, what aspects of it might be working or not. The new Administration does not bear the burden of justification.

NY Fed Bank President Says It’s Time to Evaluate Post-Crisis Regulatory Regime, Questions Effectiveness of Volcker Rule

Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“NY Fed”) President and CEO William C. Dudley articulated several principles to consider when evaluating the post-financial crisis regulatory regime and raised questions about the effectiveness of the Volcker Rule.

Mr. Dudley stated that the financial crisis exposed flaws in the regulatory framework – in particular, capital and liquidity inadequacies at large financial institutions. He cited “a number of important structural weaknesses that made it vulnerable to stress” including: (i) systemically important firms operating without sufficient capital and liquidity buffers, (ii) risk monitoring, measuring and controlling failures, (iii) significant problems in funding and derivatives markets, and (iv) fundamental defects in the securitization markets. These weaknesses, he noted, were “magnified by the lack of a good resolution process for large, complex financial firms that got into trouble.”

Mr. Dudley argued that while the industry “must resolve to never allow a return to [pre-crisis] conditions,” now is an appropriate time to begin evaluating the changes that were made to the regulatory regime. He articulated three principles to keep in mind for an effective regulatory regime:

  1. “Ensure that all financial institutions that are systemically important have enough capital and liquidity so that their risk of failure is very low, regardless of the economic environment.”
  2. “Have an effective resolution regime that allows such firms to fail without threatening to take down the rest of the nation’s financial system, and without requiring taxpayer support.”
  3. Ensure that the financial system remains resilient to shocks by preserving “the centralized clearing of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, better supervision and oversight of key financial market utilities, and the reforms of the money market mutual fund industry and the tri-party repurchase funding (“repo”) system.”

Mr. Dudley suggested that regulatory and compliance burdens could be made “considerably lighter” on smaller and medium-sized banking institutions because “the failure of such a firm will not impose large costs or stress on the broader financial system.”

Mr. Dudley also questioned whether the implementation of the Volcker Rule was achieving its policy objectives. Regulating entities under the Volcker Rule is difficult, he argued, because most market-making activity has “an element of proprietary trading” and the division between market-making and proprietary trading is “not always clear-cut.” Mr. Dudley said that while the evidence may be inconclusive, the Volcker Rule could be responsible for a decline in market liquidity of corporate bonds. Mr. Dudley strongly recommended Volcker exemptions for community banks.

Lofchie Comment: Mr. Dudley notes that the profitability of banks has dropped in light of their reduced leverage, but he asserts that they remain “profitable enough to cover their cost of capital.” What makes this remark particularly notable is the contrasting recent assertion of FDIC Vice-Chair Thomas Hoenig who claimed that (i) banks’ return on equity was low because they were too highly leveraged (a completely counterintuitive assertion that Mr. Hoenig did not fully explain) and (ii) that banks were less profitable than essentially every other industry (which would seem to suggest that banks were not profitable enough to cover their costs of capital, or at least that investors’ capital was better deployed elsewhere). Whatever is causing the decline in bank profitability (leverage too high or leverage too low), bank regulators should worry that the firms that they regulate are not making enough money to sustain themselves for the long term.

House Republicans Release Revised CHOICE Act

House Republicans released the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017. The bill is an update of the CHOICE Act of 2016. The new version represents a major overhaul of the current financial services regulatory regime including a partial repeal of Dodd-Frank.

In September 2016, the House Financial Services Committee approved the initial version of the CHOICE Act by a vote of 30 to 26. At a hearing scheduled for April 26, 2017, the Committee will discuss the updated version of the bill. Proposed changes to the current financial regulatory regime include, among other things:

  1. an opt-out of many regulatory requirements for banks and other financial institutions if they maintain a 10% leverage ratio (among other conditions);
  2. subjecting the federal banking agencies to greater congressional oversight and tighter budgetary control;
  3. materially reducing the authority of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the establishment of a new process of identifying financial institutions as “systemically important”;
  4. a repeal of the Orderly Liquidation Authority and the creation of a new bankruptcy process for banks;
  5. reforms in bank stress tests;
  6. a restructuring of the CFPB, FHFA, OCC, and FDIC into bipartisan commissions appointed by the President;
  7. the elimination of the CFPB supervisory and examination authority;
  8. a repeal of the Volcker Rule; and
  9. facilitated capital raising by small companies, including through crowd-funding.

The Committee released a summary of changes.

Regarding derivatives, the new legislation exempts certain inter-affiliate swaps from nearly all Title VII requirements (except reporting), and otherwise removes a number of changes to Title VII that were previously included (it is suggested that this is because such provisions would be addressed in CFTC reauthorization legislation).

Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) called the bill a solution that “grows our economy from Main Street up.” He asserted that the CHOICE Act is premised on the principles that all banks need to be well-capitalized and that community banks and credit unions deserve relief from the “crushing burden of over-regulation.”

Lofchie Comment: Changes that the bill would make in the regulatory process are genuinely significant. These are largely in Title III of the proposal (see page 104).

Under the terms of the bill, the various financial regulators (including the banking regulators, the CFTC and the SEC) would be prohibited from issuing a “regulation” (which term would be broadly defined) unless the regulator first issued a statement (i) stating the need for the regulation, (ii) explaining why the private market could not address the problem, (iii) analyzing the adverse impacts of the regulation, and (iv) attempting to quantify the costs and benefits of the regulation, including its effects on economic activity, the basis for its determinations, and, most significantly, “an explanation of predicted changes” that will be brought about by the regulation.  A final rulemaking would be required to include “regulatory impact metrics selected by the [regulator’s] chief economist.”

Adherence to this process would make the tasks of the regulator materially more difficult, or at least it would make it more difficult for the regulators to pass rules. Of course, there is a significant amount of good in that. Regulators should be subject to a reasonably high burden of consideration in adopting rules that may cost market participants, in the aggregate, millions of dollars in compliance costs or that have negative effects on the economy generally.

One of the most interesting provisions of the bill is the requirement that regulators should provide an explanation of predicted changes that will result from the rule. Doubtless, in many cases, the predictions will turn out to be wrong. But that is ok. It is unreasonable to expect that regulators will be always, or even that consistently, correct in their predictions. The new standard may be hard to assess, but the attempt is still worthwhile.