Monopoly Money: Facebook Executive Responds to Regulatory Concerns over Proposed Cryptocurrency

A Facebook executive responded to regulatory concerns over the company’s proposed blockchain-based cryptocurrency, “Libra.”

In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Facebook subsidiary Calibra executive David Marcus emphasized that Facebook will not release Libra until it has addressed regulatory concerns and received the necessary approvals.

Mr. Marcus clarified that, among other things:

– Libra is like cash and will serve as a payment tool, “not as an investment”;

– Libra Reserve will be subject to its respective government’s monetary policies;

– Libra Association does not intend to compete with sovereign currencies or engage in the “monetary policy arena”;

– Facebook will hold a leadership role until the Libra network launches, after which Facebook will have the same voting power as all other members;

– Libra Association will be supervised by the Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority and intends to register as a money services business with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network;

– Libra will adhere to anti-money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act requirements; and

– Libra Association “cannot . . . and will not” monetize data from the blockchain.

Mr. Marcus outlined the structure and management of Calibra, established “to provide financial services using the Libra Blockchain.” Mr. Marcus distinguished Libra and Calibra, saying that the entities are separate and that they will not exchange individual customer data. Additionally, Mr. Marcus noted that, with exceptions, Calibra will not share customers’ accounts and financial information with Facebook, and that the information will not be used for ad targeting. Facebook said that Calibra will increase user activity on Facebook, thereby generating greater advertising revenue.

COMMENTARY / STEPHEN LOFCHIE

The principal point of the statement was to assert that Libra will be operated in full compliance with all relevant national laws. As to one of the key questions concerning whether Libra coins might be a “security,” Mr. Marcus stated that it would not be because “Libra is a payment tool, not an investment. People will not buy it to hold like they would a stock or bond, expecting it to pay income or increase its value. Libra is like cash.”

Notwithstanding Mr. Marcus’ assertion, Libra raises a number of very difficult (or at least unresolved) legal questions. Unlike “stablecoins” that are completely linked to the value of a single currency (they are just representations of bank deposits), it is intended that Libra will be backed by a reserve of a number of different currencies. The relative proportions of various currencies to be held in the reserve is uncertain. The fact that Libra is not simply a virtual dollar means that, at least under current law, each purchase and sale of a Libra could be a taxable event for U.S. taxpayers. There are also securities law issues raised by, for example, the fact that the determination of the assets to back a Libra will involve discretion as to the purchase and sale of securities.

From a business standpoint, Mr. Marcus suggests that the real market for Libra may be outside of the United States or of any developed economy. Rather, the market for Libra could be principally in countries where the local currency is volatile or where there is significant uncertainty as to the soundness of the banking system. That actually makes a good deal of sense. Consumers in the United States may not have much use in their daily lives for a currency tied to a global basket of other currencies and securities that fluctuates each day, even if not that much, against the dollar. On the other hand, consumers in Venezuela might find such a currency very appealing.

CFS Monetary Measures for June 2019

Today we release CFS monetary and financial measures for June 2019. CFS Divisia M4, which is the broadest and most important measure of money, grew by 4.8% in June 2019 on a year-over-year basis versus 4.6% in May.

For Monetary and Financial Data Release Report:
http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/amfm/Divisia_Jun19.pdf

For more information about the CFS Divisia indices and the data in Excel:
http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/amfm_data.php

Bloomberg terminal users can access our monetary and financial statistics by any of the four options:

1) {ALLX DIVM }
2) {ECST T DIVMM4IY}
3) {ECST} –> ‘Monetary Sector’ –> ‘Money Supply’ –> Change Source in top right to ‘Center for Financial Stability’
4) {ECST S US MONEY SUPPLY} –> From source list on left, select ‘Center for Financial Stability’

SEC Chair Jay Clayton Responds to Criticism of Reg. Best Interest

SEC Chair Jay Clayton refuted criticism of the SEC’s recently adopted rulemaking package designed to strengthen protections afforded retail investors on services provided by broker-dealers and investment advisers. The rulemaking package consists of (i) Regulation Best Interest (“Reg. BI”), (ii) the Form CRS Relationship Summary, (iii) an interpretation of investment advisers’ fiduciary duty (the “Fiduciary Interpretation”), and (iv) an interpretation of the “solely incidental” prong of the broker-dealer exclusion under the Advisers Act.

In a speech in Boston, Mr. Clayton responded to seven claims that he believes are inaccurate, asserting that:

1. It is unrealistic to believe that it is possible to eliminate all conflicts of interest, and Reg. BI goes as far as is practicable in addressing broker-dealer conflicts of interest.

2. Reg. BI’s principle-based approach is preferable to a more prescriptive approach to the definition of “best interest,” which assumes that it would be possible to identify the “best” transaction for a particular investor.

3. The Fiduciary Interpretation applicable to investment advisers does not weaken the existing fiduciary duty but, rather, codifies existing SEC practices.

4. The Fiduciary Interpretation does require advisers to “avoid” conflicts.

5. The standards of conduct requirements under Reg. BI and the Fiduciary Interpretation cannot be met by disclosures alone, but require that firms act in the best interest of their customers.

6. Imposing an ongoing monitoring requirement on broker-dealers would not enhance Reg. BI and effectively would impose on them the duty to act as investment advisers.

7. The Form CRS Relationship Summary, along with online education resources, will provide material assistance to retail investors in understanding the duties they are owed by financial service providers.

STEVEN LOFCHIE COMMENTARY

When Regulation Best Interest was proposed, then-Commissioner Stein dissented from the proposal, saying it did not go as far as the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule Proposal; and while Commissioner Jackson voted to allow the proposal to go forward, he also criticized it as not going far enough. This should have served as a warning to Chair Clayton than any regulation that he adopted short of an imitation of the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule was going to be the target of substantial criticism. Chair Clayton proceeded on the basis that there was some middle ground of compromise that would satisfy detractors. That was simply not going to be the case.

Now, in many respects, we have ended up with the worst of all possible situations: (i) the Reg. BI adopting release fails to make any strong intellectual argument for why it is not reasonable to expect that broker-dealers can be fiduciaries to their clients; (ii) Reg. BI fails to make any distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated natural person clients (treating Warren Buffett no different from a high school dropout); (iii) Reg. BI imposes significant new obligations on broker-dealers that very well may reduce the willingness of broker-dealers to provide “full-service” brokerage to retail investors and instead result in retail investors seeking any level of advice to potentially pay a much higher charge to an investment adviser; (iv) Reg. BI fails to satisfy any of the critics who wanted a fiduciary obligation imposed on broker-dealers; and (v) states are adopting their own “suitability” rules – urged on by Commissioner Jackson – thereby moving U.S. securities regulation away from a unitary system of regulation to a fractured Brexit system. See generally Cadwalader memorandum: Choose One – Best Interest or Full Service (Apr. 26, 2018); see also SEC Adopts Regulation Best Interest (June 6, 2019).