At a Conference on Systemic Risk and Organization of the Financial System held at Chapman University, California, Mr. Hoenig described a shift in the banking industry towards consolidation among the largest banks. He noted some of the key factors that have led to this trend: (i) technological developments and financial engineering, (ii) 1990s legislation easing the strain of banking regulations, (iii) significant mergers of commercial and investment banks, and (iv) fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, including the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
Mr. Hoenig noted that, while the Dodd-Frank Act included some structural changes (such as the Volcker Rule), Congress, in large part, chose “regulatory control over structural change.” Mr. Hoenig warned that such over-reliance on regulation potentially could slow down economic growth. He instead advocated for structural change, suggesting that:
“. . . universal banks would partition their nontraditional activities into separately managed and capitalized affiliates. The safety net would be confined to the commercial bank, protecting bank depositors and the payment system so essential to commerce. Simultaneously, these protected commercial banks would be required to increase tangible equity to levels more in line with historic norms, and which the market has long viewed as the best assurance of a bank’s resilience.”
Mr. Hoenig recommended implementing a variety of other safeguards to supplement the partition, such as setting limits on the amount of debt the ultimate parent companies could downstream to subsidiaries. He also mentioned the possibility that, by allowing for resolution through bankruptcy, his proposal could reduce regulatory burdens, including the elimination of risk-based capital and liquidity, the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing, the Orderly Liquidation Authority, Living Wills, and parts of the Volcker Rule.
Lofchie Comment: One problem with the proposal is the distinction it makes between traditional and nontraditional activities. This distinction is based upon the time in which a particular type of financial activity was created and the substance of the activity. For example, entering into swap transactions (particularly as to rates and currencies) and clear swaps and futures should be viewed as core banking activities: they are activities that are completely about credit intermediation. To assert that they are not “traditional” banking activities because they were not done in the 1950s or the 1850s would be not so different from stating that email is not a traditional form of bank communication. It may not be traditional, but it is the modern version of the telephone, and it is core to what banks do.